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The legal systems of Germany and the United States contain
detailed rules that regulate the surveillance of telecommunications by
domestic law enforcement agencies.1 One initial question about this
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1. This Article's examination of telecommunications surveillance will be restricted to
activities carried out by domestic law enforcement agencies in enforcing criminal law.
Surveillance also takes place in Germany and the United States alike under separate
foreign intelligence statutes; the issues concerning that kind of surveillance are sufficiently
distinct, however, to require separate analysis. Two of the key statutory regulations
regarding surveillance in the context of foreign intelligence agencies are the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2003); and the "Article 10 Statute,"
Gesetz zu Artikel 10 Grundgesetz, v. 26.6.2001 (BGB1 I S.1254), as amended 9.1.2002
(BGBI. I S.361). It proved difficult, however, for this Article to cabin off entirely the topic
of intelligence agencies. Some of the most important judicial decisions in Germany
concerning telecommunications surveillance emerged in cases involving that country's
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surveillance concerns the relative levels of such activity in Germany
and the United States. This Article demonstrates, however, that the
available statistics do not permit the drawing of conclusions about the
relative amount of surveillance activities in the two countries.2 Any
comparison based on these data sets proves to be illusory-the
statistics measure different phenomenon.
Despite an absence of a basis for an empirical exploration of the
relative levels of telecommunications surveillance in Germany and
the United States, it is nevertheless possible to compare the legal
regulation of telecommunications surveillance in the two countries.
In Part I, this Article considers the comparative scholarship-and
methodology-of James Q. Whitman. Whitman's scholarship
concerning the "law of civility" offers a profound reminder that even
"cultural near neighbors," such as Germany and the United States,
can have deep-seated differences in their legal cultures-and ones
that can prove difficult to explain.' In its own exploration of
differences in U.S. and German telecommunications privacy law, this
Article examines countries that have two great similarities: both
Germany and the United States are democracies and have
technologically advanced telecommunications systems.4
In Parts II and III, this Article considers the comparative
constitutional law for telecommunications privacy in these two
nations. It begins with U.S. law and in Part II analyzes a series of
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court that have taken it largely out of
the business of developing constitutional standards for
telecommunications privacy. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Fourth Amendment, the critical part of the U.S. Constitution in this
regard, as protecting neither stored data in the control of third parties
nor information that falls short of being the "content" of
conversations carried by telecommunications.' Such non-content, or
intelligence agencies. Since that case law also has much to say about surveillance by
domestic law enforcement agencies, this Article discusses these opinions.
2. See infra Part I.
3. James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J.
1279, 1282 (2000).
4. As the Central Intelligence Agency states, "Germany has one of the world's most
technologically advanced telecommunications systems." Germany: Communications, in
Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook (2002), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/gm.geos/html#Comm [hereinafter C.I.A
World Factbook]. For the United States, the same source states that this country has "a
very large, technologically advanced, multipurpose communications system." United
States: Communications, in C.I.A., World Factbook, supra, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbooklgeos/us.html#Comm.
5. For analysis of the text of the Fourth Amendment, see text accompanying note 63.
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as this Article refers to these data, "telecommunication attributes,"
are generally free from Fourth Amendment protection.6
In Part III this Article finds that, in marked contrast to U.S. law,
German constitutional law regarding telecommunications
surveillance is well thought out as a doctrinal matter-indeed, it is
based on paradigms likely to lead to more useful judicial review of
telecommunications statutes in our Information Age than the U.S.
constitutional regime. The postwar German constitution, the Basic
Law, protects telecommunications secrecy in its Article 10.' In a
series of important decisions, the German Constitutional Court has
interpreted Article 10 as protecting not only telecommunications
content but also telecommunications proceedings. The Constitutional
Court has been squarely involved in judicial review of measures that
affect telecommunications privacy.
Part IV of this Article shifts from constitutional to statutory law.
and compares the statutory law for telecommunications privacy in
Germany and the United States. At the statutory level, the two legal
systems share both similarities and dissimilarities. Part IV evaluates
the regulation of the two countries by examining six categories: (1)
legal protection for customer information; (2) legal protection for
connection data; (3) legal protection for stored data; (4) legal
requirements for data retention or data erasure; (5) legal protection
for contents of telecommunications; and, finally, (6) the nature of
available remedies.'
One set of findings for Part IV follows logically enough from the
respective constitutional law in the two countries. Just as German
constitutional law does not rely on a distinction between content and
non-content, its statutory law does not draw on radically different
tests for judging law enforcement requests for content or connection
data. To be sure, German law does allow law enforcement greater
flexibility in obtaining connection data than content. Yet, German
6. I use the term "telecommunications attributes" in the same sense that Susan
Freiwald defines "communication attributes": rather than content, telecommunications
attributes are "all the other characteristics of a communication that can be learned about
it." Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital
Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 953 (1996). She adds: "These attributes include
the existence, duration and subject matter of a communication, the identities of the parties
to it, their physical locations and their electronic addresses." Id.
7. For analysis of the text of Article 10, Basic Law, see text accompanying notes 110-
19.
8. For five of the six categories, I proceed in a similar fashion. I first discuss the basic
category (e.g., what is "customer data"?) and then examine the legal test for obtaining the
information in Germany and the United States. The issue of data retention or data
erasure does not involve a test for obtaining information, however, but rather certain




law also provides connection data with relatively higher legal
safeguards before disclosure than U.S. law provides to similar
information. Moreover, stored data, which are free from Fourth
Amendment safeguards in the United States, do not represent a
constitutional or statutory category in Germany. This category,
which proves quite significant in U.S. statutory law, is not a
jurisprudential category in German telecommunications privacy law.
The final finding of this Article's Part IV concerns data erasure
and data retention. In the United States, the law requires neither
erasure nor retention of telecommunications data. Under current
German telecommunications law, in contrast, a general requirement
exists for erasure. As a specific example, telecommunications
connection data must be erased after no longer than six months. At
present, German law has no requirement of mandatory data
retention, but this area is one of current controversy. Indeed, the
controversy is occurring not only in Germany, but in the European
Union and beyond. The U.S. government is taking a role as an
international lobbyist for such a data retention requirement in other
countries.9
Finally, Part V analyzes other areas of possible influence on the
United States and German "clay" of telecommunications surveillance
law. The telecommunications law on the books may not be the only
influence on law enforcement behavior within the two countries;
other "X" factors might be at work. In particular, three other
possible influences may exist on telecommunications surveillance in
the United States and Germany beyond telecommunications law."
I. Whitman's World of "Civility" and
Comparative Wiretap Statistics
In both the United States and Germany, a well developed law of
"information privacy" exists. In process-oriented terms, information
privacy represents the creation and maintenance of rules that
structure and limit access to-and use of-personal data.'1  These
rules are sometimes found in social norms, such as the idea of limits
on sharing intimate information about one family member with non-
9. See Richard Norton-Taylor & Stuart Millar, Privacy Fear over Plan to Store Email,
GUARDIAN, Aug. 20, 2002 (noting that the United Kingdom, "encouraged by
Washington, has been pushing for a compulsory E.U.-wide data retention regime"),
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/netprivacy/article/0,2763,777574,00.html.
10. See infra Part V.
11. For a discussion of this process-oriented definition, see PAUL SCHWARTZ & JOEL
REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 5-6 (1996). For a normative definition, see Paul M.
Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 834-43 (2000) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Privacy and the State]; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,
52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1658-66 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy].
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family members (gossip). 12 Rules of information privacy are also
found in constitutional and statutory law. This Article will compare
German and U.S. approaches to a small subset of information privacy
law-telecommunications surveillance.
A. Whitman's World of "Civility" and Comparative Law Methodologies
How does one assess telecommunications privacy in two
countries on a similar yardstick? One comparative method centers on
law-and it is this Article's approach. This Article discovers that, at
least in certain ways, Germany has created a superior legal regime for
regulating telecommunications surveillance. In certain other respects,
however, the legal regulations of Germany and the United States
prove quite similar.
But can one go beyond the letter of the law and engage in any
broader sociological observations regarding telecommunications
surveillance and telecommunications privacy? For example, can one
compare the relative amount of wiretapping activity in Germany and
the United States? This Article finds that making this kind of
empirical comparison is not possible at present. This Part discusses
the difficulties in finding an empirical basis for a comparative
sociology of telecommunications surveillance law in Germany and the
United States. I first discuss and draw contrasts with James Q.
Whitman's comparative project concerning the "law of civility.' 3 I
then analyze the difficulties in drawing empirical conclusions
regarding the relative amounts of telecommunications surveillance in
Germany and the United States.
In an insightful work of comparative law scholarship, Whitman
examined the law of insult, hate speech, and sexual harassment, and
found that Germany has a historical tradition of protecting "honor"
for which no equivalence exists in the United States. 4 Whitman
describes, for example, how the German law of insult criminalizes the
lack of respect for another person." It might even be possible to be
punished by the German legal system for making a gesture called the
12. Interestingly enough, and as a contrasting view to this example, norm theorists
sometimes like gossip and dislike privacy, which is considered as merely an obstacle to
norm formation. See, e.g., ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 285 (1991)
(calling for "improved circulation of accurate reputational information").
13. Whitman defines the law of civility as "the practices that involve showing respect
to others." Whitman, supra note 3, at 1289. He distinguishes this behavior from decency,
which involves "practices that aim to avoid giving offense or calling attention to gross or
bestial aspects of life." Id.
14. Id. at 1295-1343; 1371-90.
15. Id. at 1296.
April 20031
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"bird": "the tapping of the index finger on the forehead" to indicate
"that another is mentally defective."'
6
In dialogue form, Whitman reports a conversation that he had
more than once with Germans:
American: You mean it's illegal to make a gesture like that in
Germany?
German: You mean it's not illegal in America? 7
Whitman's work is a profound reminder that even cultural near
neighbors, such as Germany and the United States, can have legal
differences that prove difficult to explain. As noted in this Article's
introduction, Whitman sagely observes, "[t]he clay of one place is not
much like the clay of another."' 8 This Article will attempt to explore
the differences in United States and German "clay" regarding
telecommunications surveillance. It begins this exploration by
considering a methodological question that Whitman's article does
not directly address-how does one demonstrate that the "clay" of
one place is different than another's?
In his analysis of Germany and the United States, Whitman
carefully traces differences regarding civility in different legal
systems. In other words, Whitman's "clay" largely consists of laws
and legal mechanisms in the different countries. Thus, he looks at
German statutes that penalize the lack of respect for another person
and shows that no such equivalent legal regulation exists in the
United States. Whitman also engages in a fascinating historical
exploration of the roots of the different conceptions of civility in
Germany and the United States and also considers novels and
newspaper accounts." A reader is soon convinced that Whitman has
sifted through and weighed everything that relates to his topic.
Yet, Whitman does not marshal compelling evidence to prove
that Germans are indeed more civil than Americans." At one point,
he complains:
My goal.., is to show that the United States displays a relative lack
of civility, both in its social practices and in its law. Showing such
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1297.
18. Id. at 1296.
19. Whitman's article also contains an analysis of civility law in France, id. at 1344-71,
but I concentrate here on his look at Germany and the United States.
20. Whitman also analyzes relevant legal texts from antiquity, see, e.g., supra note 16.
21. Indeed, his article at times appears to reason back from a conclusion regarding
comparative civility levels in different countries. Thus, he writes, "America is a place
where interpersonal relations have always been a bit rough by comparison with many
other parts of the world." Whitman, supra note 3, at 1280. Whitman also dismisses
possible counter-examples prophylatically in language that I have cited in the text. See
text accompanying note 22.
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relative differences is the great strength of comparative law;
showing such differences does not, of course, imply that the United
States has any absolute lack of civility. To readers to whose minds
exceptions spring,22 let me therefore emphasize: This is a
comparative study!
One wonders what the term "comparative study" is intended to
excuse. And, regarding a counter-example, my own preference would
certainly be to wait on line in a store in any city in the United States
rather than in one in Germany.23 Moreover, judging from my wife's
experience, the comparative readiness to help a mother traveling with
a baby in a stroller in public areas in New York, yes, New York, far
exceeds that of Berlin or its suburbs. And if this issue is not one of
civility, what is?
To be sure, Whitman does attempt to locate empirical evidence.
For example, he points to statistics showing a rapid increase in insult
citations and complaints during the 1990s in Berlin.24 One wonders,
nevertheless, whether such litigation points to interpersonal conflicts
that find release in other legal venues in the United States. Next door
neighbors in Marin County, California who insult each other
following a dispute over a fence, for example, may simply sue each
other regarding the borders of their property rather than the words
that each person said.
The fence example also leads to a final methodological point.
Robert Ellickson's pathbreaking study of law and norms in rural
Shasta County, California discovered a strong norm against litigation
of interpersonal disputes between neighbors in that area.2 ' The fence
example makes one wonder whether remaining distinctions in the law
of civility that Whitman discovers are largely a result of contemporary
Germany being generally less rural and more urban, or put
differently, far more densely populated than the United States.26
German civility law may reflect not only a particular German legal
22. Whitman, supra note 3, at 1372.
23. John Bauman III, my editor at the Hastings Law Journal, based on his own time
spent living in Germany, agrees with me regarding the comparative merits of waiting in
line in the two countries. This phenomenon may relate to different concepts of personal
space in the two countries.
24. Id. at 1300 n.58.
25. ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 184-91.
26. The F.R.G. is a country slightly smaller than Montana. Its population is eighty-
three million people; Montana, according to the 2000 Census, has 902,000 residents.
MONT. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS AND ECON. INFO. CTR., POPULATION OF
COUNTIES IN MONTANA, 1890 TO 2000, at http://ceic.commerce.state.mt.us/Demg/
historic/Censuscountyl890-2000.pdf.
April 20031
history, but also serve a unique role in a highly urbanized and densely
populated contemporary Germany.27
At any rate, civility is a tough matter to prove or disprove. What
about telecommunications privacy? One would think that evaluating
comparative levels of telecommunications surveillance activity in any
two countries to be an easy task. This assumption proves, alas,
false-at least when the two countries in question are Germany and
the United States. The next section discusses why comparison of the
respective levels of surveillance activity in these nations proves
impossible.
B. Some Comparative Statistics
According to Mark Twain, the British Prime Minister Benjamin
Disraeli once remarked upon three kinds of falsehoods: "lies,
damned lies, and statistics."2  Official yearly statistics are in fact
available that report upon the judicial orders issued for surveillance
of the "content" of telecommunications in Germany and the United
States. Yet, profound differences exist in both the underlying
respective legal regimes for telecommunications surveillance and the
way that statistics for German and United States telecommunications
surveillance activity are collected. As a consequence, any comparison
of the relative level of activity in the two countries would belong in
the Twain-Disraeli category of "lies" and "damned lies."
As an initial observation and on a more positive note, however,
certain comparisons are possible based on the statistics in Germany
and the United States concerning telecommunications surveillance.
First, in both countries, investigations relating to narcotics violations
generate the highest percentage of surveillance orders."9 In Germany,
violations of the narcotics law provided justification in fifty-nine
percent of the proceedings in 2000 in which wiretaps or other
telecommunications are sought." In contrast, the three categories of
27. As possible corroboration of this point, Whitman cites in a footnote to a German
study that identified the most frequent setting for insults in Germany that led to litigation.
The study, which looked at cases between 1957 and 1965, found the most frequent setting
for an insult to be "the common area of an apartment building." Whitman, supra note 3,
at n.45. This same study found that cases of insult also most often arise both "in the
month of August when warmer weather is conducive to more frequent social interaction"
and "between the hours of 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. when the pent-up frustrations of the day are
finally released." Id. at n.71.
28. MARK TWAIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TWAIN 149 (Charles Neider,
ed., 1990) (1959).
29. Johann Bizer, Praxis der TK-Ueberwachung, 26 Datenschutz und Datensicherung
216, 218 (2002); ADMIN. OFFICE OFTHE U.S. COURTS, 2001 WIRETAP REPORT 10 (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 WIRETAP REPORT]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2000
WIRETAP REPORT 10 (2001) [hereinafter 2000 WIRETAP REPORT].
30. Bizer, supra note 29 at 218. In these German statistics, it is possible for a single
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crimes that generated the second and third highest percentages of
surveillance orders were (1) murder, manslaughter, or genocide at
seven percent; (2) robbery or theft at six percent; and (3) criminal
violations of the asylum and refugee statutes at six percent.' In the
United States, with the most recent statistics dating from 2001,
seventy-eight percent of all applications for interceptions cited drug
offenses as the most serious offense being investigated.32 The highest
percentage of drug-related interceptions in that year (sixteen percent
of the total) came from the New York City Special Narcotics
Bureau.33 The second and third most prevalent type of offense
investigated with wiretap orders were gambling (5.5 percent) and
racketeering (five percent).34
Second, in both countries, law enforcement agencies in certain
geographic areas generate a disproportionate amount of surveillance
orders. In the United States, state law enforcement officials generate
far more wiretaps than federal officials, and a few states are
responsible for the most wiretaps. 5  For example, state judges
authorized 1,005 of the 1,491 wiretaps issued.36 Seven states were
responsible for ninety-three percent of all authorizations by state
judges: New York (425 applications), California (130 applicants),
Illinois (128 applications), New Jersey (99 applications), Pennsylvania
(54 applications), Florida (51 applications), and Maryland (49
applications).3" In Germany, data are available that break down state-
by-state the number of criminal trials in which wiretap evidence has
been used in a given year. These data have then been further ranked
by the relative population of each state (trials with wiretap evidence
per 100,000 inhabitants). In the year 2000, these ranged from a high
of 8.27 for such trials in Hamburg, to 4.04 in Berlin, and 2.23 for
North Rhine-Westfalia.8  Johann Bizer observes that these
differences cannot be alone attributed to the varying "population
structures" in the different states (as Hamburg, for example, has a
similar population makeup to Berlin). Bizer also points to significant
statistical differences in surveillance rates between states with similar
conservative governments, such as Baden-Wiurttemburg (5.15 trials
with wiretap evidence per thousand inhabitants) and Bavaria (3.53
trials). These differences indicate that in both Germany and the
proceeding in which a wiretap was authorized to involve several crimes. Id.
31. Id. at 218.
32. 2001 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 29 at 9.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 2001 WIRETAP REPORTS, supra note 29, at 7. Id.
36. Id
37. Id.
38. Bizer, supra note 29, at 218.
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United States law enforcement requests for telecommunications
surveillance are driven by local enforcement norms as well as any law
on the books.
To turn to an exploration of the difficulties of a statistical
comparison concerning relative levels of surveillance, one can begin
by noting that yearly statistics are collected in both Germany and the
United States regarding the judicial orders that authorize surveillance
of telecommunications "content." An initial glance at the numerical
data would also leave one sanguine as to the possibilities of
comparison. Particularly promising in this regard is that both
countries define the term "content" in a similar fashion. The United
States Code defines "content" of telecommunications as "any
information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning" of "any
wire, oral or electronic communications."" Germany utilizes a similar
concept of "content," although the term itself is not defined in
German statutory law.' In Germany, surveillance of the content of
communications is primarily regulated by section 100a of the Federal
Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung)4 The equivalent
regulation in the United States is found in Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1968.42
Relative population statistics should also be noted at this point.
The United States has 287 million residents, more than three times
more than Germany, with 83 million residents.43 The population
figures appear, at least initially, significant because the raw (and, as
we shall see, misleading) comparative statistics seem to indicate that,
even without adjusting for population differences, German law
enforcement agencies engage in far more wiretapping.
During the year 2001, the last period for which we have statistics
for both countries, Germany issued 23,806 surveillance orders for
telecommunications content, whereas the United States issued 1,405
orders.44 The comparative statistics for past years are similar: in 2000,
Germany issued 15,741 surveillance orders, and the United States
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2003).
40. For a discussion, see infra Part IV.E.
41. § 100a StPO. For concise analysis of this section of the law, see GERD PFEIFFER,
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG, § 100a, at 206-13 (4th ed. 2002).
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22.
43. All population figures are from the C.I.A., World Factbook, supra note 4. For
Germany, see People: Germany, available at http://www.cia.gov/ciapublications/factbook/
geos/gm.html#Intro. For the United States, see People: United States, available at
http://www.cia.gov/ciapublications/factbook/geos/us.html#People.
44. 2001 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 29, at 9. The U.S. Wiretap Reports are posted
online at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap.html. For the German statistics for 2001, see
Regulierungsbehorde fir Telekommunikation und Post, Jahresstatistik nach § 88 Abs. 5
TKG (2002) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
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1,910.41 In 1999, Germany issued 12,651 surveillance orders, and the
United States, 1,350.46 In 1998, Germany issued 9,802 surveillance
orders, and the United States, 1,327. 47  Finally, in 1997, Germany
issued 7,762 surveillance orders, and the United States, 1,149.48 Yet,
as noted, these statistics can not be compared to one another because
they measure different phenomena.
To begin with, the United States statistics require certain "back
of the envelope" adjustments. One such adjustment is needed
because the United States data likely do not completely reflect state,
as opposed to federal, surveillance activities. With the pro bono
support of the law firm Morrison & Foerster, the bipartisan
"Constitution Project" recently carried out a survey of state
developments regarding surveillance law.49 The Constitution Project
noted that only twenty-five of the forty-six states that permit
surveillance reported their activities in 2001 to the Administrative
Office of the Federal Court."' It may be that all, some, or none of
these states engaged in telecommunications surveillance. The
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts does not require reports to be
filed if there is no interception activity in a state during a given year."
The Constitution Project was unable, at any rate, to discover the level
of surveillance in the missing states.
As a rough "back of the envelope" revision, one might simply
double the number of state wiretaps in the United States and adjust
the total number of U.S. wiretaps upwards. Such a relative hefty
adjustment may be justified due to the large increase in recent years
in state as opposed to federal surveillance orders in the United
45. For the United States, the information is found in the 2000 WIRETAP REPORT 5
(2001). For the German statistics, see Bizer, supra note 29, at 217.
46. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1999 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (2000); Bizer,
supra note 29, at 217.
47. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1998 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (1999); Bizer,
supra note 29, at 217.
48. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1997 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (1998); Bizer,
supra note 29, at 217.
49. For more information, see The Constitution Project, Liberty and Security
Initiative Main Page: Privacy and Technology, at http://www.constitutionproject.org/
Is.index.html.
50. Charles H. Kennedy & Peter P. Swire, State Wiretaps and Electronic Surveillance
After September 11, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 972-73. The paper commented that reporting
of state interception activities may be less thorough than reporting of federal intercepts."
Id. at 973. See also 18 U.S.C. 2519(1) (requiring filing of reports with the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts requiring each order or extension that has been requested).
51. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Reporting Requirements on Intercepted Wire,
Oral, or Electronic Communications 2 (on file with Hastings Law Journal). The statutory
requirements for filing reports obligate judges who issue or deny surveillance orders as
well as state prosecuting attorneys and other officials to file information about these
orders. 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (2003).
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States. 2  As already noted, in 2001, for example, state judges
authorized 1,005 of the 1,491 wiretaps approved in the United States
in that year. A further adjustment upwards also appears necessary
because the data for the United States do not include order
extensions, which are included in the German numbers. Fortunately,
the order extensions are listed-albeit as a separate item-in the
annual reports on wiretap activities from the Administrative Office of
the Courts." All of these adjustments to the U.S. data set are possible
and would seem to leave the number of U.S. surveillance orders
significantly below the German numbers.
Ultimately, however, any attempt at an empirical comparison
collapses due to three differences in how the statistics in the United
States and Germany are maintained. These differences reflect
underlying distinctions in the legal regulation of telecommunications
surveillance in the two countries. We will consider these differences
in ascending order according to the difficulty that they present to
drawing conclusions about the relative levels of surveillance activity
in the two countries.
First, roving wiretaps are permitted in the United States, but not
in Germany. Since 1986 U.S. law has permitted domestic law
enforcement agencies to issue these orders, which are centered
around a suspect and not any specific telecommunications
connection. The USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 granted roving
wiretap authority to intelligence agencies. 6 In contrast, a suspect in
Germany with access to numerous telecommunications devices (such
as multiple fixed line telephones in different locations, cell phones, e-
mail accounts, pager devices) cannot be made subject to a single
surveillance order tied to her person. 7 As a result, a single roving
wiretap order in the United States involves activity that is counted by
several surveillance orders in Germany. Although judges issue only a
small amount of roving wiretap orders in any given year in the United
States, there is also an absence of data about how many devices are
included per roving wiretap order in the United States." Thus, I have
52. 2001 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 29, at 5.
53. Id.
54. For the 2001 extensions, see id. at 8. In 2001, 1,008 extensions were requested and
authorized. Id.
55. The United States permits waiving the requirement that the government specify
the facilities to be subject to a court order when "there is probable cause to believe that
the person's actions could have the effect of thwarting interception from a specified
facility." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (2003).
56. USA PATRIOT Act § 206, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2003).
57. See Bizer, supra note 29.
58. Thus, in 2001, sixteen roving wiretaps were authorized in the United States. 2002
WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 29, at 9.
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chosen to list this issue on the far side of the "comparative statistics"
divide.
Second, German wiretap statistics reflect a separate counting for
each time that a telecommunications connection (Anschluss) is placed
under surveillance. In other words, the German law enforcement
statistics, which are issued by the Regulatory Authority for
Telecommunications and Mail (Regulierungsbehirde ffir
Telekommunikation und Post), do not count merely the orders that
are issued, but the connections that are placed under surveillance. In
contrast, in the United States, a single judicial order can be used to
place surveillance on multiple lines. As the 2001 Wiretap Report
concisely states, "[n]o statistics are available on the number of devices
installed for each authorized order."5 9 In other words, the annual
reports in the United States do not provide any breakdown as to the
number of connections placed under surveillance-only on the
number of judicial orders. A single wiretap order in the United
States can reflect one, three, eight, or more connections being placed
under surveillance.
Third, Germany does not allow a "consent" exception to its
requirement for surveillance orders. In Germany, constitutional
protection remains in place unless all parties to a communication
consent to surveillance. This result follows because Article 10 of the
German constitution safeguards confidentiality for participants in
telecommunications. In contrast, under U.S. constitutional and
federal statutory law, any single individual's consent to surveillance of
telecommunications to which she is a party releases the government
from any obligation to seek a judicial order.6' Consequently, an
unknown number of "consent" wiretaps in the United States fall
outside of the U.S. statistics whereas in Germany similar law
enforcement activities are counted in the national wiretap statistics.
Thus, the German statistics include numerous surveillance
requests that are not included in the U.S. statistics. The respective
German and U.S. statistics regarding surveillance orders end by
measuring different phenomena. Moreover, it is not possible to
adjust the respective data sets to account for the underlying
differences. As a result of these difficulties with the data, one cannot
make any judgments regarding the respective levels of domestic
surveillance activity in Germany and the United States.
59. 2001 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 29, at 6. Moreover, the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts explicitly requests that the reports filed with it not include the
phone numbers of persons intercepted. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note
51, at 5.
60. See infra Part I.A.
61. See infra Part II.
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As a modest proposal, however, one can suggest that the
collection of the United States data be altered to include the number
of connections that are placed under surveillance.62 Until the U.S.
statistics include this information, they measure less the amount of
surveillance undertaken by law enforcement agencies than the
amount of instances of surveillance oversight by the judicial branch.
Furthermore, the law in the United States should require all states to
file an annual report with the responsible federal official even if no
surveillance activity takes place in a particular year. Having noted
the absence of adequate comparative statistics, this Article now turns
to the different aspects of the constitutional and statutory law
regulating telecommunications surveillance in the United States and
Germany. Finally, Part V of the Article considers three additional
areas that may exert influence on the two regimes of
telecommunications surveillance.
II. U.S. Constitutional Law and Telecommunications Privacy:
Non-Content Data, Stored Information, and
the Fourth Amendment
In American law, the Fourth Amendment is the critical
constitutional provision regarding telecommunications surveillance.
The Fourth Amendment first establishes the right of the people to be
secure from "unreasonable searches and seizures" in their "papers,
and effects." It also prohibits the issuing of search warrants on less
than "probable cause." The text of this Amendment raises numerous
interpretative issues, not the least of which is the relationship
between the "unreasonable search" prohibition and the "probable
cause" requirement for search warrants.63 For our purposes, however,
the most important issue for telecommunications privacy concerns the
kind of behavior that is considered a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes.
In two areas, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment in a fashion that leaves telecommunications surveillance
largely free from constitutional restrictions. The first set of relevant
decisions finds the Fourth Amendment to be inapplicable to data
62. Improvements are also possible in the German telecommunication surveillance
statistics. For example, Bizer wishes to see a breakdown that includes the name of the
state officials who sought the surveillance order and the alleged crime investigated. Bizer,
supra note 29, at 218. This kind of information would give a sense of whether certain
jurisdictions within a state were generating a disproportionate number of wiretap orders.
63. For a discussion of the relationship between these two clauses, see Silas J.
Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory,
77 GEO. L.J. 19, 80-84 (1988); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth
Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257,281-304 (1984).
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stored in the control of third parties. The second set of decisions
declares this amendment inapplicable to telecommunications
attributes that fall short of being the "content" of a telephone
conversation. The Supreme Court had articulated the controlling
case law by the end of the 1970s. Barring a reversal of both strands,
the most critical decisions regarding telecommunications privacy will
necessarily take place on the statutory level and free from
constitutional constraints.
Why is the Fourth Amendment not applicable to data stored in
the control of third parties? Why does it not apply to a wide range of
telecommunications attributes, which become mere non-content
within the logic of the current constitutional privacy paradigm?
Concerning data stored in the control of third parties, the
Supreme Court addressed this issue in 1976 in United States v. 
Miller.4
The defendant claimed a Fourth Amendment interest in bank
records, whether consisting of microfilms, checks, deposit slips or
other records. 65 The defendant's claim before the Supreme Court was
that the bank records were "merely records of personal records that
were made available to the banks for a limited 2 urpose and in which
he has a reasonable expectation of privacy." The Miller Court
rejected this argument-it stated that there was no "legitimate
'expectation of privacy' in the particular documents., 67  These
documents were not private papers, but merely "the business records
of the banks."
The Court based its finding regarding the lack of a privacy
interest in bank records on a "risk" analysis. As Justice Powell wrote
for the majority, "[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to
the Government."69  Thus, the Court was not interested in the
subjective privacy expectations of the bank depositor; the Court was
unmoved by the defendant's argument that he had revealed the data
"on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and
that the confidence will not be betrayed."7 The bank customer bears
the risk that the government may prove interested in her banking
records. As Daniel Solove summarizes the Court's logic, "since
64. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
65. Id. at 440-42.
66. Id. at 442.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 440.
69. Id. at 443.
70. Id. at 442.
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information maintained by third parties is exposed to others, it is not
private, and therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment."7'
The "risk analysis" also suggests the absence of constitutional
protection if a party to a communication offers her consent to state
surveillance. In the United States, one bears the risk that any party to
whom one reveals her affairs will share this information with the
government. For example, if one party consents to
telecommunications surveillance, the government need not obtain a
judicial order to engage in wiretapping. Beyond "risk analysis," the
Supreme Court has also justified the "consent exception" in a
different fashion. This judicial analysis occurred in a case involving a
consent to a search of shared physical premise, but is equally
applicable to the telecommunications context. In that case, the Court
found that permitting third-party consent to searches by government
bolstered a societal interest in discovering and punishing crime as well
as the citizen's interest in aiding law enforcement.
Statutory law provides no more protection than constitutional
law regarding a single party's consent to government surveillance of
telecommunications. As the Department of Justice's manual on
obtaining electronic evidence notes, the relevant statutory language
authorizes monitoring "when one of the parties to the communication
consents to the interception."74  Consent can be either express or
implied.75
The lack of a constitutional privacy interest in third party records
also played an important role in the establishment of the Supreme
Court's distinction between "content" and telecommunications
attributes. This distinction emerged over the course of several
opinions, the most important of which were Katz v. United States,
decided in 1967, and Smith v. Maryland, decided in 1979.76 Other
significant cases in this series are Berger v. United States (1967), and a
71. Daniel Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1087 (2002).
72. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). For further analysis, see Mary I.
Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1640-42 (1987).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) & (d) (2003).
74. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS § IV(3)(b) (July 2002), available
at http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.html [hereinafter DOJ, SEARCH &
SEIZURE MANUAL].
75. Id.
76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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decision I have already mentioned, namely Miller v. United States
(1976)7
The first step in drawing the content/non-content distinction was
Katz v. United States, in which the Court decided that a device for
recording conversations placed on the outside of a public phone
booth implicated the Fourth Amendment.78 It stated that the "Fourth
Amendment protected people, not places," and found that this
Amendment's protections extended to communications which the
individual "seeks to protect as private, even in an area accessible to
the public., 79 In entering the phone booth, the petitioner had sought
to exclude "the uninvited ear" from hearing the content of his
conversation." As a result, the petitioner was "entitled to assume
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to
the world. "8'
In Berger, another case from 1967, the Supreme Court defined
the constitutional parameters for surveillance of the content of
communications. It found the Fourth Amendment to require the
interposition of "a neutral and detached authority" between the
police and the public before the issuing of a order for surveillance of
content." The Berger Court also articulated a particularization
requirement regarding the crime to be investigated and the
conversations sought to be captured. Surveillance is also permissible
only when subject to a termination date. 3 Congress quickly reacted
to Katz and Smith and enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act of 1968. Title III expressed statutory guidelines,
pursuant to Katz and Berger, that set conditions for the wiretapping
of telephone conversations.'
The next stage in the development of the Court's jurisprudence
of telecommunications privacy occurred in 1979 with Smith v.
Maryland.8 This case saw the full and final emergence of the
Supreme Court's distinction between "content" and "non-content,"
or in the terminology of this Article, between "content" and
"telecommunication attributes." Smith concerned law enforcement
use of a "pen register," a device for recording telephone numbers
77. Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976).
78. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
79. Id. at 351-52.
80. Id. at 352.
81. Id.
82. Berger, 388 U.S. at 54.
83. Id. at 60.
84. Title III is now codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2003).
85. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)
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dialed. 6 A similar device, the "trap and trace" device, is used by law
enforcement agencies to capture the numbers received by a
telephone. 7
In Smith, the police had placed a pen register on the phone of a
person accused of making threatening phone calls."8 Thus, in contrast
to Katz, the Smith Court addressed police behavior that captured the
numbers dialed from a phone, but not the words spoken in a
conversation. In the judgment of the Supreme Court, installation of a
pen register did not constitute a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Reaching back to Justice Harlan's concurrence
in Katz, the Smith Court noted that the application of the Fourth
Amendment depended on "whether the person invoking its
protection can claim a Justifiable,' a 'reasonable' or a 'legitimate
expectation of privacy.'" The Court made further use of Harlan's
opinion by accepting his division of the necessary inquiry into two
distinctive elements.9' The first element looked to the presence of a
"subjective" expectation of privacy. Did an individual exhibit a
personal belief that his behavior was private? Or, to put the inquiry
slightly differently, had the individual "shown that 'he seeks to
preserve [something] as private'? 92  The second inquiry considers
whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy was
"reasonable."93  Was the individual's subjective expectation of
privacy, "viewed objectively," one that was "'justifiable' under the
circumstances" ?94
In Smith, the Court rejected the idea that either a subjective or
objective expectation of privacy existed in the phone number that one
dialed. Both questions were not, however, of equal importance for
the Smith Court. Indeed, the Court applied the first question in a
fashion that collapsed it into the second question. The Smith Court
looked less for any subjective expectation of the specific defendant
than for a subjective expectation of the reasonable telephone
consumer.
86. Id. at 736 n.1.
87. For discussion of the two devices, see Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After
the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 631-33 (2003).
Susan Freiwald has noted the expanded capacity to record new kinds of
telecommunication attributes of new generation pen registers for use in surveillance of
pagers and cellular phones. Freiwald, supra note 6, at 987-99.
88. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
89. Id. at 742-45.
90. Id. at 740-41. For criticisms of the Court's lack of a methodology for finding a
legitimate expectation of privacy, see Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 63, at 29-32.
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In answering the first question, in other words, the Court
evaluated only the basic structure of telephony as it then existed.95
The Smith Court helpfully summarized its findings on this score:
"telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey
numerical information to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this information; and that the
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of
legitimate business purposes."96  In other words, a reasonable
telephone consumer would not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy." The answer to the first question, therefore, sounds a lot like
the answer to the second question, which concerned the presence of
an objective privacy expectation.
Not surprisingly then, the Smith Court also found the absence of
any objective privacy expectation. In making this evaluation, the
Court relied on Miller and subsequent decisions that rejected any
privacy expectation in information that "a person ... voluntarily turns
over to third parties."98 At this point, we see the long reach of Miller.
The Smith Court viewed the telephone consumer in terms similar to
the banking customer in Miller: "[P]etitioner voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business." 99 He
bore the risk, in turn, that "the company would reveal to police the
numbers he dialed."'
Thus, while the Fourth Amendment protects content, as per
Katz, it reaches neither stored data nor non-content. The results of
these cases have been to remove stored content in the control of third
parties, non-content, and an ever expanding range of
95. A result of this technical structure is that "[a]ll telephone users realize that they
must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone
company switching equipment that their calls are completed." Id. at 742. The Smith
Court continued its analysis of subjective expectations by pointing to other elements in the
structure of telephony that prevented any subjective expectation of privacy. Thus, all who
used the telephone were obliged to realize that the phone company made permanent
records of the numbers that they dialed. After all, phone consumers "see a list of their
long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills." Id. The Smith Court also observed that
public phone directories informed consumers that the telephone company would be able
to help identify persons making annoying phone calls. This announcement pointed as well
to a collection of the dialed numbers by the phone company. Id.
96. Id. at 743.
97. The Supreme Court seemed indecisive, in some of its language as to whether a
subjective expectation rested on behavior or belief. After all, the petitioner in the case
insisted that he in fact had enjoyed a subjective expectation of privacy. See, e.g., id. From
a certain perspective then, the Court was telling him that he did not have the belief that he
claimed. See id.
98. Id. at 743-44.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 744_
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telecommunication attributes from the zone of Fourth Amendment
constitutional protection. Speaking of the consequences of this
regime for cyberspace, Orin Kerr states, "[tihe Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has left Internet
surveillance law to develop as a primarily statutory field."'"' In
broader terms, Solove notes, "we are becoming a society of records,
and these records are not held by us, but by third parties."'' 2 The
removal of these records from Fourth Amendment protection means
that constitutional strictures do not apply to most of the law of
telecommunications privacy in the United States."
This constitutional jurisprudence is problematic. The available
kinds of telecommunication attributes are more detailed today than
had been possible at the time of Smith. These data, the collection of
which we will analyze in Part IV, can include: "records of session
times and durations"; "any temporarily assigned network address,";
"any credit card or bank account number" used for payment
(examples of "customer information" from United States law); and
"dialing, routing, addressing and signaling information" that is in
transmission (examples of "connection data" from United States
law).'"4
We should therefore again ponder the Smith Court's decision
that a list of phone numbers dialed are outside the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. Justice Stewart's dissent objected in
commonsense terms to the "content" versus "non-content"
distinction seized upon by the majority. He wrote, "[t]he numbers
dialed from a private telephone-although certainly more prosaic
than the conversation itself-are not without 'content.""" Stewart
reached this conclusion because a list of this information, even if it
were not incriminating, "easily could reveal the identities of the
persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate
details of a person's life."""' This observation, already true in 1979 at
101. Orin Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of Internet Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 843
(2003).
102. Solove, supra note 71, at 1089. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 11, at
63 ("[A] precondition to modern life is that increasing amounts of personal information be
stored outside an individual's control.").
103. To be sure, the Supreme Court does remain involved so long as the content of
telecommunications is involved. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (civil
damage action under Title III concerning a radio commentator playing a tape of
conversation that he had reason to know was illegally intercepted).
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703, 3121 (2003), see infra Part IV.
105. Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
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the time of Smith, has only become more telling following the
development of digital telephony and mobile telephony.0 7
For Raymond Ku, the Fourth Amendment should play an
important role in "preserving the people's authority over
government-the people's sovereign right to determine how and
when government may intrude into the lives and influence the
behavior of its citizens.". Ku envisions this authority being exercised
through judicial review of the use of new technologies that intrude on
the public."° However, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment in the context of telecommunications
surveillance has removed a critical category of searches from
constitutional scrutiny.
III. German Constitutional Law and
Telecommunications Privacy
We begin our examination of German constitutional law by
looking at the relevant constitutional text. Article 10 of the Basic
Law, the postwar German constitution, contains both language dating
from the initial enactment of the document in 1949 and language
added to it through constitutional amendment in 1968. The original
text is now found in Article 10(1) and the start of Article 10(2); the
language of the 1968 amendment was added to the end of Article
10(2).
In Article 10(1), the German constitution, in language from 1949,
declares: "The secrecy of letters, as well as of the post and
telecommunications, is inviolable.".. 0 At the start of Article 10(2), the
Basic Law continues, also in language from 1949: "Restrictions may
only be ordered pursuant to a statute... Thus, from the time of the
German constitution's promulgation, telecommunications secrecy has
been both a fundamental right and one subject to statutory
limitations.
Our evaluation of Article 10's original concept of postal and
telecommunications secrecy also requires examination of certain
other aspects of the Basic Law. In particular, the German
constitution places three substantial limits on the ability of the
legislature to enact laws that limit Article 10 or other basic
constitutional rights. First, statutory law or constitutional
107. Susan Freiwald has made a similar point in cataloging the expanded capacity of
newer generation "pen registers" in the digital age. Freiwald, supra note 6, at 987-89.
108. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the
Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002).
109. Id. at 1350-67.
110. § 10 Nr. 1 GG.
111. § 10 Nr. 2 GG.
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amendments in Germany are limited by Article 19's prohibition of
constitutional alterations that infringe upon the essence
(Wesensgehalt) of a fundamental right."2 Thus, even if made in a
procedurally perfect fashion, a statute or a constitutional amendment
is nevertheless void if it infringes upon Article 10's core protections
for telecommunications privacy.
Second, the "Eternity Clause" of the Basic Law, expressed in
Article 79(3), prohibits amendment to the constitution or enactment
of statutes that infringe upon the "principles laid down in Articles 1
and 20" of the Basic Law."3 Of these two provisions, Article 1 has
been of the greatest significance in the context of telecommunications
secrecy. Article 1 of the Basic Law protects human dignity and places
it at the center of the German constitutional order."4 Article 79(3)'s
Eternity Clause forbids any wiretapping or surveillance statute that
infringes upon human dignity as protected by the Basic Law.
Finally, the German constitution shapes Article 10 through a
requirement that any statute infringing upon a fundamental right be
consistent with the constitutional principle of the "rule of law"
(Rechtstaatlichkeit). The idea of the rule of law finds one of its most
important expressions in Article 20, which binds all legislation "to the
constitutional order" and the executive and judiciary to "law and
justice."'' 5 The Constitutional Court has used the concept of the "rule
of law" to develop the further "principle of proportionality"
(Grundsatz der VerhiiltnismiJJligkeit).' 6 It has developed a three
prong test for evaluating the proportionality of legislation. First, a
court asks whether the means chosen are suitable (geeignet). Second,
a court inquires whether the means chosen are necessary
(erforderlich). Finally, the court examines whether the means chosen
are reasonable (zumutbar)."'7
112. § 19 GG. For a discussion, see HANS D. JARASS & BODO PIEROTH,
GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 471 (2002).
113. § 79 Nr. 3 GG. For a discussion, see JARASS & PIEROTH, supra note 112, at 894-
97.
114. § 1 GG.
115. § 20 GG. Another important mention of the "rule of law" in the Grundgesetz is
found at § 28 GG, which concerns the individual states.
116. For application of the test by the Constitutional Court, see BVerfGE, 100 (1999),
313 (373, 390-96). For a discussion, see JARASS & PIEROTH, supra note 112, at 530-34;
INGO RICHTER ET AL., CASEBOOK VERFASSUNGSRECHT 22-29 (4th ed. 2001).
117. The first test, the idea of suitability, requires legislation to choose means that
promote the sought-after objective in some way. This hurdle is the least rigorous of the
three; it is similar to rational basis review in U.S. constitutional law. Second, the concept
of necessity means that there must be no way to meet the legislative objective that would
be less injurious to the citizen's rights. Thus, if enforcement of certain provisions in
German criminal law would be possible without telecommunications surveillance, this
activity would not be allowed. Finally, the idea of reasonableness, also termed
"proportional in the 'narrow sense,"' requires consideration of whether the interference
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Thus far, we have considered the original language of Article 10
and aspects of German constitutional law that limit alterations to it.
As noted, however, Article 10 also contains language added to the
Basic Law in 1968 through constitutional amendment.' 8 This
constitutional amendment, the text of which was added to the end of
Article 10(2), permits: (1) surveillance to occur without the affected
person ever being informed of it; and (2) surveillance without judicial
review, but through "a review of the case by bodies and auxiliary
bodies appointed by Parliament."" 9  However, this amendment
permits these two measures only if necessary to protect "the free
democratic basic order or the existence or security of the Federation
or a state." 20 In sum, the 1968 amendments permit secret surveillance
without notice to the affected party and creation of a new
governmental body to oversee certain wiretap requests, but only
when the national security is at stake.
As one might imagine, there is a story behind this amendment to
Article 10. After the Allied Powers defeated the Third Reich in 1945,
they carried out surveillance of letters and telecommunications in
Germany based on their status as occupying powers.'2' The so-called
"Western" Allied Powers, namely, Britain, France and the United
States, continued this surveillance within the territory that became
the Federal Republic of Germany ("F.R.G.") even after the F.R.G.
assumed sovereignty under the Basic Law in 1954."2 In the Germany
Treaty of 1952, the "Western" Allied Powers declared, however, that
they would stop surveillance activities in the F.R.G. as soon as the
respective German authorities received similar powers under German
law.
123
In 1968, the German legislature created such authority for
surveillance in German law. It enacted both the amendment to
Article 10, discussed above, and a bill, the "Statute for Article 10"
will be commensurate with the sought-after objective. This final branch of the
proportionality test requires evaluation of the relation between the selected means and the
goals. JARASS & PIEROTH, supra note 112, at 530-34; RICHTER ET AL, supra note 116, at
22-29.
118. For a discussion by the Constitutional Court, see BVerfGE, 30 (1970), 1 (4-5, 17-
19).
119. § 10 Nr. 2 GG.
120. Id.
121. BVerfGE, 30, at 4-5.
122. Id.
123. Id. The promise was not kept. Through an electronic system often referred to as
Echelon, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other nations engage in top secret
automated interception of telecommunications on a global basis. For an official study of
Echelon, carried out on behalf of the European Parliament of the European Union, see
Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information,
Working Document for the STOA Panel, Luxembourg, Oct. 1999.
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(Gesetz zu Artikel 10). '24 Following a constitutional challenge to the
amendment and statute, the Constitutional Court upheld the
constitutional amendment and most of the statute in 1970 in its
"Monitoring" opinion (Abhbrurteil).'25 The rest of this Part considers
this opinion and two other important decisions of the Constitutional
Court relating to telecommunications privacy: the "Connection
Capture" (Fangschaltung) opinion from 1992 and the "BND"
(Bundesnachrichtendienst) opinion from 1999.26
A. The "Monitoring" Opinion
In this decision, the German Constitutional Court began by
noting that the Basic Law established a state that was meant to be a
"combative democracy" (streitbare Demokratie).'27  This
constitutional requirement calls for the democratic order to be
capable of defending itself from any who would destroy it.128 The
German Court noted that, consistent with this constitutional
orientation, it would not allow "[o]pponents of the constitution" to
make use of constitutional freedoms "to endanger, harm or destroy
the further existence of the state.' 29 In the United States, Abraham
Lincoln had used similar language and logic to justify his suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus during the South's armed attack on the
Union and its attempt to destroy the constitutional order of the
United States.'30
Beyond the idea of the "combative democracy," the
Constitutional Court observed that the Basic Law, read in its full
context and taken as a textual whole, viewed the individual not as an
isolated, sovereign entity, but a person anchored in a community.'3'
Quoting an earlier case, the Constitutional Court noted that the Basic
Law resolved "the tension individual-community in the sense of the
communal connection and the communal dependence of the person,
without infringing upon the intrinsic value of" human worth. 32 The
notion of the "combative democracy" and the communal connection
of the individual provided key points in the Constitutional Court's
124. BVerfGE, 30, at 4-5.
125. Id.
126. BVerfGE, 85 (1992), 386 ("connection capture" case); BVerfGE, 100 (1999), 313
("BND" case).
127. BVerfGE, 30, at 19.
128. Id. at 19-20.
129. Id. at 20.
130. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in THE
PORTABLE ABRAHAM LINCOLN 209, 215-16 (Andrew Delbanco ed., 1992).
131. BVerfGE, 30, at 19.
132. Id. at 20.
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upholding of all of the 1968 amendment to Article 10 and most, but
not all, of the "Statute for Article 10."
In general, the Constitutional Court found the part of the
constitutional amendment and statutory provisions that exclude those
under surveillance from notification to be constitutional. This
restriction was seen as meeting all necessary constitutional
safeguards, including those of Article 79(3) regarding the "Eternity
Clause" of the constitution. The Court stated: "In the present
context, the exclusion of the notification is not an expression of a
disdain for the human person and her worth, but a burden that falls
on the citizen and is demanded of her on account of the lrotection of
the stability of her State and the free democratic order."'
The Court also found permissible the recourse in the amendment
and the statute to a non-judicial governmental body, rather than the
ordinary judiciary, for oversight of certain foreign intelligence
wiretaps."' The German legislature had decided that the wiretaps of
intelligence agencies were not to be reviewed by the normal judiciary.
While judicial review was not necessary, oversight of this surveillance
was needed. In the absence of oversight, the Court stated it would be
unconstitutional to subject an affected party to "the arbitrariness of
the administrators.' ' 135 The Court observed, however, that this impact
would not occur when there was a substitute body consisting of
independent members and providing as effective material and
procedural control of the surveillance as the judiciary provided for
wiretaps sought under the authority of criminal law. 36 The organ set
up for such review of requests for wiretaps by an intelligence agency
is the so-called "G-10 Group" (G-1O Gremium). In the United States,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") has also
established a special body to review requests for intelligence agency
surveillance. 1' In contrast to Germany's non-judicial body, the
United States makes use of a special FISA trial court, as well as a
FISA appeal court, consisting of Article III judges.' These judges
are all appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
133. Id. at 20-21.
134. Id. at 20-24.
135. Id. at 27.
136. Id. at 23.
137. The FISA courts have recently made news with their first reported opinions. In re
All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611
(Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct.
2002).
138. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2003).
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Court; in Germany, the G-10 Group has its members appointed by
Parliament.'39
While the "Monitoring" Opinion found the constitutional
amendment to Article 10 permissible, it declared one aspect of the
accompanying statute to violate the "principle of proportionality.""'4 °
The Statute for Article 10's section 5(5) prohibited informing affected
parties of surveillance under all circumstances.' The Constitutional
Court found that such secrecy regarding surveillance was proper only
so long as the interests of the State justified secrecy. The
Constitutional Court declared this part of the statute void due to its
"exclusion on informing the affected party about the restrictive
measures also when it can occur without endangering the goal of the
restriction."
142
The "Monitoring" Opinion shows the Constitutional Court
squarely involved in judicial review of measures that affect
telecommunications privacy. The Constitutional Court saw itself as
necessarily involved in reviewing the constitutionality of any laws that
placed limits on Article 10. Indeed, the Constitutional Court has
continued its oversight of telecommunications privacy legislation
since this decision in 1970.
An important aspect of the different scope of
telecommunications privacy in Germany and the United States
concerns the "consent" exception for surveillance. As already noted,
the United States allows a single party to consent to
telecommunications and other kinds of surveillance. Such searches
can take place without a judicial order. In Germany, in contrast, the
constitutional protection that extends to telecommunications
continues until all the parties to the communication consent. The
German Constitutional Court made this point explicitly in the
"Connection Capture" case. The German court stated: "If the goal
of telecommunications secrecy rests in protecting the records and
content of communications from governmental seizure, every
governmental intervention (Einschaltung) that does not follow from
139. 50 U.S.C. § 1803; Gesetz zu § 10 GG, v. 26.6.2001 (BGBI I S.1254), as amended on
Sept. 1, 2002 (BGBI. I S.361).
140. BVerfGE, 30, at 21.
141. Id. at 21-22.
142. Id. at 32. The "Monitoring" opinion was a 5-3 opinion, with three dissenting
judges arguing, among other points, that the constitutional amendment of 1968 was itself
unconstitutional under Article 79(3)'s "Eternity Clause." Id. at 38-44. The dissenting
judges also objected to the lack of explicit provisions for independence of the G-10 Group
in the Article 10 statute as written as well as its allowing for secret procedures that
excluded the affected party. Id. at 44-47. Finally, the dissenting judges objected to the use
of the concept of "combative democracy" by the majority; in their view, the danger was
that if the legislator ignored the value of individual rights, the "combative democracy"
would end by being turned against itself. Id. at 45.
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the agreement of both communications partners is a violation of
constitutional rights.' 4 3
B. "Connection Capture" Opinion
The "Connection Capture" decision concerned the German
equivalent of the pen register. As we have seen, the United States
Supreme Court decided in Smith v. Maryland in 1979, that a pen
register, which captured the telephone numbers that one dialed, did
not implicate the Fourth Amendment.'" In the "Connection
Capture" opinion, the Constitutional Court came to a different
conclusion regarding similar practices under Article 10.14 Similar to
the pen register in the Smith case, the "Connection Capture" decision
concerned a tracing of phone calls to stop threatening calls that were
being made anonymously.'46
The Constitutional Court found that just as the German
constitution protected "communications content," it also protected
"communications proceedings" (Kommunikationsvorgang) .' The
Court explained, "[t]he protection [of the constitution] extends... to
communication proceedings. Protected are the specific circumstances
of the telecommunications relationship.' 4 8  It found that
telecommunications privacy even extended to the fact that a call had
been attempted, but never completed. 49 The Court was breaking no
new ground for German law. 5 One scholar has even traced such
respect for communications privacy back to a Prussian Statute that
required the Post Office, among other mandatory dimensions of
postal secrecy, to maintain silence about the name of the persons to
whom letters were sent.' Thus, a clear distinction exists between the
broad scope of telecommunications privacy in German constitutional
law and the narrow scope in United States constitutional law, which
protects only telecommunications content.
In the "Connection Capture" case, the Constitutional Court also
found that an adequate statutory basis did not exist for collection of
143. BVerfGE, 85 (1992), 386 (399).
144. 442 U.S. 735, 742-45 (1979). The Smith decision is discussed in Part II, supra.
145. BVerfGE, 85, at 386. The Constitutional Court described the practice at stake in
this fashion: "connection capture permits the participant, by dialing a number issued to
him, to maintain a connection during a telephone call and to allow the ascertaining of the
number from which he was being called." Id. at 392.
146. Id. at 390.
147. Id. at 396 (emphasis in original).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. For an earlier decision along similar lines, see BVerfGE, 67 (1984), 157 (171-72).
151. Joachim Riess, Vom Fernmeldegeheimnis zum Telekommunikationsgeheimnis, in
DATENSCHUTZ iM TELEKOMMUNIKATIONS 127,138 (Alfred B01lesbach ed., 1997).
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telephone numbers with the device under scrutiny in the case.'52 To
the extent that any legal justification existed for use of the device, it
consisted of general statutory laws concerning the use of personal
data by the Post Office and Deutsche Telekom, the traditional
provider of telephony in Germany, as well as a regulation that
granted Deutsche Telekom the power to investigate misuse of its
services."' The Constitutional Court demanded the enactment of a
"legal authorization for intervention" (gesetzliche Ein-
griffermachtigung) as soon as possible, but also permitted the practice
to continue until this legal authority was in place.'54 Its grounds for
doing so shows how the Court's telecommunications jurisprudence
must consider other constitutional values in addition to Article 10.
The Constitutional Court noted that threatening calls, if left
unchecked, posed a threat to certain aspects of the Basic Law. The
first threat was to the general right of personality, which the Court in
previous decisions identified in the Basic Law's Article 2(1) and
Article 1(1).' The second was a right to corporal integrity, expressed
in the Basic Law's Article 2(2).156 Pointing to a significant "gap in
protection" (Schutzliicke) of the right to corporal integrity that would
open if this practice was forbidden, the German Court stated that
"Connection Capture" could continue for a limited time even
without an adequate statutory basis.'57
C. "BND" Opinion
In this opinion, the Constitutional Court reviewed the
constitutionality of legislation that allowed the Federal Intelligence
Service (Bundesnachrictendienst or "BND") to engage in surveillance
of international telecommunications and to share the resulting
information with other agencies.' The legislation in question dated
primarily from 1994; it had widened the scope of the BND's area of
surveillance over international telecommunications. 9 In its opinion,
the Constitutional Court found numerous aspects of the statute
unconstitutional. 6"
152. BVerfGE, 85, at 398-99.
153. BVerfGE, 100 (1999), 313 (387-90).
154. Id. at 400-02.
155. Id. at 400.
156. Id. at 400-401.
157. Id. For a discussion of the current regulation of this practice, see BECK'SCHE
TKG-KOMMENTAR 1451-52 (Wolfgang Buchner et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter TKG
TREATISE].
158. BVerfGE, 100, at 313.
159. Id. at 317-23.
160. Id. at 358-403.
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At this point, a few words should be said about German law
regarding telecommunications surveillance carried out by intelligence
agencies. The BND is one of several different German intelligence
agencies; its job is to collect and analyze information about foreign
countries that are of importance for the foreign policy and security of
the F.R.G. 6'
The BND and other German intelligence agencies are permitted
to engage in surveillance of letters, conversations, or
telecommunications by two paths. First, the surveillance can take
place as an "individual investigation," which involves the collection of
personal data to investigate criminal behavior that threatens the
survival of the F.R.G. or its democratic order.162 Second, the
surveillance can take place as "strategic surveillance." '163 As an
example of strategic surveillance, the BND uses certain search terms
in examining telegram traffic to and from Germany."6 In the "BND"
case itself, the strategic surveillance involved observation of telegram,
fax, and, to a lesser extent, telephone traffic transmitted via satellite.'
The Constitutional Court also noted that the government had
admitted in oral argument before it that plans were also being made
for surveillance of e-mails, but the Court did not provide further
details about this project.
Prior to statutory amendments in 1994, strategic surveillance was
permitted only for the purpose of early recognition and prevention of
an armed attack on the F.R.G.16 More specifically, the primary focus
of German strategic surveillance during the Cold War was the armed
forces of Warsaw Pact nations. However, by 1994 Germany had been
re-unified, and the Cold War was winding down. In that year, the
German legislature reacted to new threats to the F.R.G. by enacting
the "Crime Fighting Statute" (Verbrechensbekimpfungsgesetz), which
widened the grounds for "strategic surveillance." 6  This statute
permits surveillance of international telecommunications to gain
information about: (1) international terrorism; (2) drug smuggling
into Germany; (3) illegal arms trafficking; and (4) international
money laundering and counterfeiting operations.'9 The statute also
allows information garnered through this surveillance to be shared
161. Bundesnachrichtendienst, Der BND als Informationsdienstleiter, at
http://www.bundesnachrichtendienst.de/auftrag/index.htm.
162. BVerfGE, 100, at 316.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 379-80.
165. Id. at 380.
166. Id. at 318-20.
167. Id. at 317-18.
168. Id. at 318.
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with security and law enforcement agencies to prevent, solve, and
prosecute criminal activity.'69
In its "BND" opinion of 1999, the Constitutional Court first
found that the protections of Article 10 were not limited merely to
communications that took place entirely within the national borders
of Germany. As long as enough of a nexus existed between the
surveillance and German territory, the protections of Article 10 of the
constitution were applicable.'7 ° Such a nexus was found in the present
case, where the governmental surveillance activity occurred from
within Germany and at least part of the communications ended or
originated from within Germany.7
The Constitutional Court also found that the dangers of such
surveillance were considerable.' Most importantly, it pointed to the
risk that such surveillance would lead to "a nervousness in
communication, to disturbances in communication, and to behavioral
accommodation, in particular to avoidance of certain content of
conversations or terms.""' Put concisely, the threat was to social
communication.
There are strong parallels here, as the Constitutional Court itself
noted with its earlier decision in the "Census Case" of 1983. In that
famous opinion, the Court articulated "the right of informational self-
determination," which it identified in Articles 1 and 2 of the
constitution.74 The German right of informational self-determination
protects an individual from borderless collection, storage, application,
and transmission of personal data.75 It prevents any processing of
personal data that leads to an inspection of or an influence upon a
person that is capable of destroying an individual capacity for self-
governance.76 Moreover, this right places an obligation on the State
to organize data processing so that personal autonomy will be
respected. 177 Finally, the right of informational self-determination is
not merely an individual right, but one that seeks to protect a certain
communicative capacity within society.77 As the Census Court noted,
169. Id.
170. Id. at 363-64.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 381.
173. Id.
174. BVerfGE, 65 (1983), 1. For a proposal to draw on the right of information self-
determination in modernizing the German concept of information privacy, see
ALEXANDER ROSSNAGEL ET AL., MODERNISIERUNG DES DATENSCHUTZRECHTS 45-48
(2001).
175. Id. at 42.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 46-52.
178. Spiros Simitis, Das Volkszahlungsurteil oder der lange Web zur Informationsakese,
83 KRITISCHE VIERTEUAHRESSCHRIFT 359, 368 (2000).
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"[t]he individual does not have a right in the sense of an absolute,
unlimitable mastery over 'his' data; he is rather a personality that
develops within a social community and is dependent upon
communication. '  Information relating to a person depicts "an
image of social reality that the concerned party cannot exclusively
coordinate."' "'
Interestingly enough, the right of informational self-
determination was not directly applicable in the "BND" case. As an
established matter of German constitutional jurisprudence, the
Constitutional Court was obliged to center its opinion on the specific
provisions of Article 10 rather than the general right of personality
and the related right of informational self-determination."' At the
same time, however, the Court in the "BND" case did not hesitate to
draw parallels between the right of informational self-determination
and the protections that it identified in Article 10. As I have noted,
the first such parallel concerned the connection between information
privacy and free societal communication; this link is discussed in both
the "Census" and "BND" opinions."8' Second, and as a related point,
the Constitutional Court in both cases observed how the negative
impact of surveillance would be felt not only by the individual, but by
society as a whole."83 Indeed, in the "BND" decision, the Court
observed that in its case law regarding the right of individual self-
determination, it had identified a similar "connection to the common
good" (Gemeinwohlbezug) 4
After noting that the data collected in the "BND" case raised
threats to societal communication, the Constitutional Court
nevertheless found the surveillance to have a strong justification. The
activity to be placed under observation "affected the foreign and
security politics of the Federal Republic... to a significant extent." '85
The law permitted the collection of information necessary to detect
dangers to Germany; as a result, the Constitutional Court generally
found that the statute was generally "not improper.'
186
179. BVerfGE, 65, at 44.
180. Id. See Paul M. Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional
Law: Towards an American Right of Informational Self-Determination, 37 AM. J. COMP.
L. 675, 690 (1989) ("the right of informational self-determination compels the State to
organize data processing so that personal autonomy will be respected").
181. BVerfGE, 67 (1984), 157 (171); BVerfGE, 6 (1954), 32 (37).
182. BVerfGE, 65, at 1, 43; BVerfGE, 100, at 381.
183. BVerfGE, 65, at 1, 43.
184. BVerfGE, 100, at 381.
185. Id. at 382.
186. Id. at 384-85
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The Constitutional Court did go on, however, to find several
aspects of the statute to be unconstitutional.187 Among the elements
of the law found unconstitutional were certain provisions concerning
transfer of the personal data by the BND to other agencies. These
transfers were only permissible when the controlling legislation
fulfilled the principle of proportionality.1 8 The Constitutional Court
decided that, as a general matter, it was constitutional for the BND to
share information gained from its surveillance of telecommunications
traffic with other agencies to the extent that the data in question
revealed criminal behavior. However, the statute did not limit these
data transfers in a permissible fashion. The Court called for
restrictions on data sharing to instances in which serious crimes had
been committed, as opposed to more minor delicts, and it also
demanded standards for intelligence agencies that restricted transfer
of information in a manner similar to domestic law enforcement
agencies when engaged in the "individual investigation path."'1 89
V. U.S. and German Statutory Law:
Six Categories of Comparison
Thus far, this Article has noted significant differences between
the constitutional regimes regarding telecommunications privacy in
the United States and Germany. The Constitutional Court has
actively reviewed statutes that affect telecommunications secrecy. In
contrast, the United States Supreme Court has developed doctrines
that have taken it out of the business of constitutional review of laws
regarding the processing, collection, and sharing of
telecommunication attributes. This Part considers the comparative
legislative regimes for telecommunications privacy in Germany and
the United States.
My analysis concentrates on six areas of the two legal regimes:
(1) the extent of legal protection for customer information (such as
one's name, address, telephone number, or non-dynamic IP address);
(2) the extent of legal protection for connection data (such as the
telephone numbers called; time and length of connection; one's
dynamic IP address); (3) the extent of legal protection for stored data;
187. For example, the statute's section 3(1)(2)(5) permitted international surveillance
to investigate counterfeiting of currency. The Constitutional Court found that the statutes
allowing surveillance to prevent this crime did not follow the principle of
"proportionality." Id. at 385. It noted, however, that such surveillance would be
constitutionally permissible if the strategic surveillance was limited to cases that
threatened "the stability of the value of the currency of Germany and thereby the
economic power of the country." Id.
188. See text accompanying note 116.
189. BVerfGE, 100, at 385-86.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
GERMAN & U.S. TELECOM PRIVACY LAW
(4) the extent of legal requirements placed on telecommunications
providers for data retention or data erasure; (5) the extent of legal
protection for the content of telecommunications; and, finally, the (6)
nature of available remedies (e.g., the exclusionary rule, civil
damages, or both).
A. Legal Protection for Customer Information
The legal tests for governmental access to customer information
are dissimilar in Germany and the United States, but so are the
underlying categories. In Germany "customer information" is easier
to obtain than in the United States, but the German category is far
narrower. Thus, at the start of this discussion, one must explain the
categorical differences in the two countries.
(1) Defining the Category
In Germany, customer information is defined in the applicable
law as extending only to information such as name, address,
telephone number, and non-dynamic IP address."g These data are
literally termed "inventory information," (Bestandsdaten), which is a
narrower concept than the closest equivalent under U.S. law,
especially in light of post 9-11 amendments to the law made through
the USA PATRIOT Act.
Before enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, "customer
information" in the United States included data such as name,
address, telephone number, billing records, and types of services.'9 1
The USA PATRIOT Act broadened this category to include records
of session times and durations, any temporarily assigned network
address (i.e., dynamic IP address), and any credit card or bank
account number used for payment. 2 The differences in the German
and U.S. concept of customer information should be kept in mind as
we consider the legal tests in the two countries to obtain access to the
data.
(2) Tests for Obtaining Access to the Information
In Germany, it is quite easy to obtain "inventory information."
Law enforcement officials can request it when required for discharge
of "their legal functions,"' 93 and judicial review of this request does
not occur. Moreover, under one path for obtaining this information,
190. § 90 Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG). For a discussion of the limited data to be
included in this category, see TKG TREATISE, supra note 157, at 1503--04.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)(A) & (B) (Supp. 2002).
192. Id. § 2703(c)(2)(C)-(F).
193. § 90 TKG.
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the telecommunications provider or ISP does not even process the
request.
German law requires telecommunication providers to maintain
automated data banks that contain "inventory information.' ' 94 Law
enforcement requests for it are made to a special independent
"regulatory authority," which is located within the Federal Ministry
of Economics.' 95  The regulatory authority responds to law
enforcement requests for customer information by retrieving
inventory information. The authority is required by law to maintain a
log of the information demands.' 96 In 2002, an administrative law
court in Northrhine-Westfalia extended this obligation regarding
collection of inventory information to mobile telephony providers
who sold pre-paid products; the court decided that the statute
required these providers to collect the standard set of "inventory
information. ,197
German law also permits direct requests for customer
information to be made to telecommunications providers. The
providers are to turn over customer information in individual cases if
necessary for "the prosecution of criminal and administrative
offenses, for averting danger to public safety or order, or for the
discharge of legal functions."'99 The direct requests, like requests to
the automated data banks, can be made by a wide array of German
law enforcement and intelligence agencies.' 9' Also like requests to the
automated data bank, the direct requests are free of judicial review.
In the United States, the statutory requirements for obtaining
access to customer information are higher than in Germany. The
legal test for customer information requires proof of "specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the.., records or other information sought are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation."' Note, however, that
this test is a lower one than the full "probable cause" requirement in
place in the United States before access to "content" can be
granted.' Also in contrast to Germany, a court order is required for
disclosure of customer information in the United States."2
194. Id.
195. § 66 TKG.
196. § 90 TKG.
197. Oberverwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen, BeschluB, v. 17.5.2002, in 26
DATENSCHUTZ UND DATENSICHERHEIT 563 (2002).
198. § 89 Nr. 6 TKG.
199. Id.
200. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (Supp. 2002).
201. For the "probable cause" test for content, see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2003).
202. Id. § 2703(a).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
GERMAN & U.S. TELECOM PRIVACY LAW
B. Legal Protection for Connection Data
Germany and the United States have developed similar
definitions for connection data. Hence, a comparison in this area is
easier than for customer information and leads to the conclusion that
law enforcement authorities in the United States face lower hurdles in
obtaining connection information than their German counterparts.
(1) Defining the Category
In Germany, "connection data" (Verbindungsdaten) includes
telephone numbers called, time and length of the connection, the IP
address of services used, one's dynamic IP address, and certain
limited information garnered from URL's visited, such as data
pertaining to services used (e.g., "http"; "ftp"; and "pop server") and
the name of the host server (IP address and domain name)."3
In the United States, the concept of "connection data" emerged
as a result of the Katz and Smith decisions, discussed above. In
response to these decisions, Congress enacted the Pen Register Act to
regulate access to telephone numbers collected by pen registers and
trap and trace devices."° More recently, the category of "connection
data" has been expanded by enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act,
which extends the Pen Register Act to "dialing, routing, addressing,
[and] signaling information.""2 5
(2) Tests for Obtaining Access to the Information
In Germany, access to connection data is regulated by two parts
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozef3ordnung), namely
sections 100g and 100h. Connection data can be obtained both
retrospectively and, due to changes to this statute made after 9-11,
prospectively."' An order (Anordnung) for a wiretap must come from
a judge unless there is imminent danger (Gefahr in Verzug). °7 An
order for connection data requires a suspicion based on "determinate
facts" that the person whose data will be collected is a perpetrator or
203. § 100g Nr. 3 StPO; § 6 Nr. 1 Telekommunikationsdatenschutzverordnung
("TDSV"); § 6 Nr. 3 Teledienstdatenschutzgesetz. For an analysis, see Pfeiffer, supra note
41, at 225; THOMAS KONIGSHOFEN, TDSV: KOMMENTAR 63-68 (2002); Alexander Dix
& Peter Schaar, TDDSG-Kommentar, in RECHT DER MULTIMEDIA-GESETZE
(Alexander Rossnager ed., forthcoming 2003).
204. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 (2003).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (Supp. 2002).
206. § 100g-h StPO . For a concise analysis, see Johann Bizer, Verpflichtung zur
Herausgabe von TK-Verbindungen an den Staatsanwalt, 26 DATENSCHUTZ UND
DATENSICHERUNG 237 (2002). The relevant statute is valid only until December 31,
2004. Id.
207. § 100h StPO. For a discussion of the emergency exception, see Pfeiffer, supra note
41, at 225-26.
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participant in a serious offense (eine Straftrat von erheblicher
Bedeutung), especially an offense listed in section ll0a of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, or an offense committed with use of a
telecommunications device, such as a telephone or computer.08 The
idea of restricting surveillance to investigations of certain serious
"listed crimes" is also used in the United States, where the equivalent
term of art is "predicate offenses." The German test allows law
enforcement officials greater flexibility in obtaining connection data
than content-as we shall see later, a surveillance order for content
can only be made if a listed criminal offense is involved. In contrast,
connection data can be obtained for any serious offense or offense
made with use of a telephone or computer.9' The idea, as this statute
also explicitly states, is to allow the investigation of crimes committed
over the telephone or on the Internet.21° As an example of such a
crime, one German treatise points to the making of insulting
telephone calls."'
In the United States, connection data is also easier to obtain than
in Germany. Under the Pen Register Act, this information can be
obtained after law enforcement officials file an order with a court that
states that the "information likely to be obtained ... is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation."" There is no independent judicial
investigation of the merits of such a request. The court is to approve
requests filed with it.23 Here, the USA PATRIOT Act enacted one
minor-but positive-change that improves the reporting
requirements regarding such orders under the Pen Register Act. The
Pen Register Act requires the Attorney General to file an annual
report with Congress on the number of pen register orders. The USA
PATRIOT Act mandates further specification regarding the precise
contents of these reports."4 Moreover, the extension of the Pen
Register Act to the Internet has also been accompanied with detailed
requirements for a paper trail following official use of such a device.215
C. Legal Protection for Stored Data
Thus far, we have examined one category, customer data, that is
defined differently enough in Germany and the United States to
make comparisons between legal regimes difficult. This Article's next
area for consideration, stored data, also reveals significant
208. § 100g StPO.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Pfeiffer, supra note 41, at 224.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (Supp. 2002).
213. Freiwald, supra note 6, at 972; 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1)-(2).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 3126 (2000).
215. Id. § 3123(a)(3)(A).
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differences. In fact, it is a category that exists only in United States
telecommunications law.
(1) Defining the Category
In Germany, stored data is not a legal category. This result is not
surprising in light of the Constitutional Court's case law, which has
never found stored data to be subject to lesser or different protection
than information within the control of the individual to whom it
refers. Thus, the relevant German categories concern "customer
information," "connection data," and "content."
In the United States, the concept of stored data dates at least
back to the Supreme Court's Miller and Smith opinions."6 As a
consequence of these opinions, information stored in the control of
the third parties is free from the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. At least in partial reaction to these opinions and also as
a result of technological developments in electronic communications,
Congress carried out a major revision to the Wiretap Act of 1968
(which had represented its first step at regulating telecommunications
surveillance) and enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986 ("ECPA").2"7 The technological advance in question was
computer-assisted communication, which in 1986 generally meant
only computer bulletin boards, but by 2002 would mean the Internet.
In the ECPA, Congress decided to allow the stricter standards of
the Wiretap Act to apply only to electronic communications during
their transmission.28 As a result, stored data are generally subject to a
statutorily lower level of protection. As discussed below, however,
Congress also made an important exception to this rule for content in
storage fewer than 180 days.2 9 Finally, non-content information in
storage at a service provider is subject to tests similar to those under
the Wiretap Act for non-content intercepted while in transmission.22 °
(2) Tests for Obtaining Access to the Information
As noted, Germany makes no use of the concept of "stored data"
in its telecommunications privacy law. In the United States, content
found in storage for fewer than 180 days is subject to the same
216. See Part II supra.
217. ECPA is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2003). For a discussion of the
background of the Act, see Freiwald, supra note 6, at 969-95; Kerr, supra note 101, at 814-
15.
218. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2003) (regulations regarding interception during
transmission) to 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (regulations regarding unlawful access to stored
communications).
219. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. 2002).
220. Id. § 2703(c).
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"probable cause" requirement as found in the Wiretap Act.22' After
180 days, however, content can be obtained "with prior notice from
the governmental entity to the subscriber or customer" if the
government obtains an administrative or judicial subpoena.222 Non-
content information in storage can also be obtained pursuant to a
subpoena; the law requires a showing of "specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe.., contents...
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." '223
D. Legal Requirements for Data Retention and/or Erasure
The fourth category concerns whether German or the United
States law places requirements on telecommunications providers
either to maintain telecommunications information for a certain
period or to erase it after a certain period. As an example, a legal
system might only require data retention. Thus, the law might
mandate telecommunications traffic data to be stored for a year. A
country might also combine both requirements: it might require ISPs
to store e-mail content for all customers for a certain period and also
require that all such information be destroyed after that time.
We will now reverse this Part's usual order of analysis and begin
with the United States. In the United States, there is neither a data
retention nor an erasure requirement for telecommunications
information.224 Other areas of U.S. privacy law do contain data
erasure requirements. These include the Video Privacy Protection
Act,225 and the Cable Communication Policy Act.226 Another United
States statute, the Fair Credit Report Act takes a different tack; it
excludes from inclusion in a "consumer report," various kinds of
information according to different expiration dates.227 Thus, excluded
from consumer reports are: bankruptcy reports that are ten years old
or more; paid tax liens that are seven years old or more; and "any
other adverse information," which "antedates the report by more
221. Id. § 2703(a).
222. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B).
223. Id. § 2703(d).
224. See ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, OPINION 5/2002 ON THE STATEMENT OF THE
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONERS AT THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE IN CARDIFF (9-11 SEPTEMBER 2002) ON MANDATORY SYSTEMATIC
RETENTION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC DATA (Oct. 11, 2002), at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp64-en.pdf (noting
the lack of data retention in the United States at the same time as E.U.-wide proposals are
circulating for data retention).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (2003) (destruction of information after one year).
226. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2003) (destruction of information "if the information is no longer
necessary for which it was collected").
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2003)
[Vol. 54
GERMAN & U.S. TELECOM PRIVACY LAW
than seven years., 2P In contrast, telecommunications providers are
generally under no legal obligation to store any set of information or
to erase it after a set time. The lack of any such requirement in the
United States has been noticed by German telecommunication
providers, who argue that introduction of a data retention
requirement in Germany would put them at a competitive
disadvantage."9
In summary, the current regime in the United States requires
neither data erasure nor storage. Germany has no data storage
requirement but does have a strong data erasure requirement. The
chief German requirements for data erasure are found in different
statutes depending on whether the party concerned is deemed a
"teleservice provider," which is a party offering services over the
Internet (such as Amazon Germany), or a "telecommunication
service provider," which is a party iroviding telecommunication
services (such as Deutsche Telekom).' The two statutes reach the
same result concerning data retention: teleservice providers and
telecommunication service providers alike may retain connection
data necessary for billing for no longer than six months.3 Of course,
teleservice providers and telecommunication service providers may
also choose to store information for shorter periods because, as
noted, Germany has no data retention requirement. Finally, other
information, such as certain connection data that is not needed for
billing pur Poses, is to be erased at once by telecommunications
providers.
However, the topic of required data storage is currently the
subject of significant political debate at present in Germany, the
European Union, and beyond. Even prior to the terrorist attacks on
9-11, certain European nations had considered or adopted a data
retention requirement. As an example of such a requirement
adopted prior to 9-11, Belgium mandated a one year traffic retention
requirement in a computer crime law enacted on November 28,
2000.233 Post 9-11, Denmark has enacted a requirement that ISPs
retain traffic data.3 As a final example, and one for a nation outside
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2003).
229. See infra text accompanying note 246.
230. The Teledienstedatenschutzgesetz ("TDDSG") regulates teleservice providers.
The Telekommunikationsdatenschutzverordnung ("TDSV") regulates telecommunications
service providers.
231. § 6 (2) 1-2 TDDSG; § 7 (3) TDSV.
232. § 6 (3) TDSV. For a discussion of this obligation, see TKG TREATISE, supra note
157, at 1481.
233. Projet de Loi relatif A ]a criminalit6 informatique, Art. 14, Doc 50, 0213/007 (Mar.
30, 2000).
234. GENERAL SECRETARIAT, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
MULTIDISCIPLINARY GROUP ON ORGANISED CRIME, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONNAIRE
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the European Union, Switzerland has enacted a requirement for ISPs
not only to record traffic data, but also e-mail content and to store
this information for at least six months.235
The United States government has emerged as a behind-the-
scenes voice in favor of E.U. countries adopting data retention
requirements.236 In contrast, European data protection commissioners
are strongly opposing the creation of such a data retention
requirement in the European Union.237 The E.U. Directive on privacy
and electronic communications, which takes effect on October 31,
2003, contains two provisions concerning data storage. Recital 26
requires that data relating to subscribers to electronic
communications networks be stored "only to the extent that is
necessary for the provision of the service for the purpose of billing
and for interconnection payments, and for a limited time. 238 Yet, the
Directive's Article 15 allows E.U. Member States to "adopt
legislative measures providing for the retention of data for a limited
period" for protection of national security and prosecution of
crimes. 239 The Working Group of E.U. data protection commissioners
has issued an opinion stating that the routine storage period for
billing purposes should generally be for "a maximum of 3-6
months. 
2 4 0
Germany is also now considering a data retention requirement.
German law enforcement agencies are demanding legally mandated
data retention with the claim that their work has been hindered by
the lack of such a requirement.4  Opposed to such a requirement are
the nation's data protection authorities at the federal and state levels.
In a Resolution issued at the Sixty-Fourth Annual Conference of
ON DATA RETENTION (2002) [hereinafter E.U., QUESTIONNAIRE ON DATA
RETETENTION], at http://www.effi.org/eu-2002-11-20.htm.
235. Eugene Oscappella, Swiss Surveillance Law Will Hit ISPs, PRIVACY LAWS & BUS.
INT'L NEWSL. 24 (Sept. 2002).
236. Norton-Taylor & Millar, supra note 9, at 1.
237. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, supra note 224. At the same time,
evidence exists of plans for mandatory data retention underway at the E.U.-level. A
framework document of the Eurpean Union's Justice and Home Affairs Minister has been
leaked to Statewatch, a European human rights organization. The framework document
plans "compulsory" data retention for twelve to twenty-four months. EU: Data Retention
To Be "Compulsory" for 12-24 months, STATEWATCH NEWS ONLINE, Aug. 23, 2002, at
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/aug/05datafdl.htm.
238. Council Directive 2002/58/EC 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37-47 (concerning the processing
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector).
239. Id. at Art. 15.
240. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, OPINION 1/2003 ON THE STORAGE
OF TRAFFIC DATA FOR BILLING PURPOSES 7 (Jan. 29, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/interna1market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp6 9 _en.pdf. Data
may be stored for a longer period if, for example, there is a dispute regarding a bill. Id.
241. E.U., QUESTIONNAIRE ON DATA RETENTION, supra note 234, at 27.
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German Data Protection Authorities, the commissioners spoke of
"the meaning of telecommunications secrecy as an inalienable
prerequisite for a free, democratic communicative society" and
pointed to possible constitutional barriers to any data retention
requirement.2' In its Census Decision, which established the right of
informational self-determination, the Constitutional Court had
explicitly noted the unconstitutionality of a "collection of data in a
stockpile (Daten auf Vorrat) for indeterminate or not yet determined
goals." '243 In that opinion and others, the Constitutional Court has
looked for a limitation on data being collected to the "legally
determined goal." '244 Should a law mandating data retention be
enacted, constitutional litigation is likely to follow.
25
Finally, as noted above, German telecommunication providers
have raised an objection to a data retention requirement on economic
grounds. As summarized by the German delegation to a Council of
Europe Multidisciplinary Group on Organized Crime, these
telecommunication providers "are afraid of being at a competitive
disadvantage vis-A-vis foreign service providers and having to pay
high costs for storing data.",2  To the extent that European-wide data
retention requirements for storage are now being considered, the
competitive disadvantage will not be with other European
telecommunication companies but with companies in the United
States, who are free of any data storage obligation.
E. Legal Protection for Telecommunications Content
Both the United States and Germany provide similar definitions
for telecommunications content. In addition, both countries require
242. ENTSCHLIE13UNG DER 64. KONFERENZ DER DATENSCHUTZBEAUFTRAGTEN DES
BUNDES UND DER LANDER VOM. 24.10.-25.10.2002 [hereinafter RESOLUTION OF DATA
PROTECTION COMMISSIONS], at Datenschutz-Berlin, http://www.datenschutz-
berlin.de/doc/de/konf/64/internet.htm (homepage of the Berlin Data Protection
Commissioner). The Federal Data Protection Commissioner has also individually
expressed his opposition to data retention. Pressmitteilung, Der Bundesbeauftrage fur
den Datenschutz, Bundesratsmehrheit plant unakzeptable "Vorratspeicherung" fur
Internet- und Telekommunikationsdaten (May 5, 2002), available at
http://www.bfd.bund.de/Presse/pm20020531.html (last visited May 13, 2002).
243. BVerfGE, 65 (1983), 1 (44).
244. BVerfGE, May 15, 1984, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2271 (1984)
(FlickauschuB); BVerfGE, June 27, 1991, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRiFT 2129,
2132 (1991).
245. The Data Protection Commissioners have also called for the leaders of the
German government to provide more information about any negotiations with other
European governments and demanded that the German government oppose the
introduction of a Europe-wide uniform data retention requirement. RESOLUTION OF
DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONERS, supra note 242, at 2.
246. E.U., QUESTIONNAIRE ON DATA RETENTION, supra note 234, at 30.
April 20031
judicial involvement in the issuing of surveillance orders unless there
is an emerge:lcy. All and all, the tests for obtaining content
information in Germany and the United States are similar.
(1) Defining the Category
German telecommunications law does not explicitly define the
term "content," but clearly uses the concept in a similar fashion to the
United States. Perhaps the best evidence of the similarity of the
concept is the fashion in which the "Capture Connection" decision
analyzed the meaning of "communication content" and
"communications proceedings. 2 47  This decision demonstrates that
German law uses the term, "content" to mean the substance of a
communication." In a similar fashion, under United States
telecommunications privacy law, "contents" means "any information
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning" of "any wire, oral or
electronic communication.
2 49
(2) Tests for Obtaining Access to the Information
In Germany, obtaining wiretaps for content requires use of a
somewhat similar test as for connection data. The connection data
that is sought must be "necessary" for an investigation of a listed
criminal offense, and a judge must also find that "determinate facts"
indicate that the person whose data will be collected is a perpetrator
or participant in such a listed offense.2 0 The listed offenses are found
in section 100a of the German Code of Criminal Procedural.29'
Similar to the increase in "predicate offenses" in the United
States, the "listed offenses" have expanded in Germany.252 In the
latest expansion, which occurred after 9-11, membership in a terrorist
organization was added to the listed offenses for which one can get a
surveillance order.253 Unless imminent danger exists, an order for a
247. BVerfGE, 85 (1992), 386.
248. Id. at 396.
249. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2000).
250. § 100a StPO.
251. Id. at § 100a Nr. 1.
252. According to Johann Bizer, the German list of crimes serious enough to justify
telecommunications surveillance has been expanded nineteen times since 1968. Johann
Bizet, Telekommunikation und Innere Sicherheit 2001: Neue Entwicklungen im
Telekommunikationsrecht, in JAHRBUCH TELEKOMMUNIKATION UND GESELLSCHAFT
2002 (Herbert Kubicek, ed, forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 9) [hereinafter Bizet,
Telekommunikation und Innere Sicherheit 2001] (as of 2001, section 100a StPO expanded
seventeen times); Johann Bizer, TK-Uberwachung in Deutschland: Arten-Umfang 6 (Oct.
21, 2002) (on file with Hastings Law Journal) (section 100a StPO expanded nineteen
times).
253. Bizet, Telekommunikation und Innere Sicherheit 2001, supra note 252 (manuscript
at 12).
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wiretap must come from a judge.254 Finally, and as noted above in
Part I, Germany does not allow roving wiretap orders. As the
Federal Code of Criminal Procedure section 100b makes clear, each
surveillance order must include the name and address of the written
party and the telephone connection to be made subject to the
255measure.
In the United States, law enforcement agencies that engage in
surveillance of telecommunications content must meet a full
"probable cause" requirement to obtain a search warrant from a
judge. The requirement of "probable cause" occurs at three levels. A
judge must find probable cause regarding a belief: (1) that the person
"is committing, has committed, or is about to commit" a predicate
offense; (2) that "particular communications concerning that offense
will be obtained through such interception;" and (3) that "the
facilities from which, or the place where" the communications are to
be intercepted are used in connection with the commission of the
offense or are used by the person named in the wiretap order.56
Moreover, wiretap orders for content are only permitted if
normal investigative procedures have already been used, are unlikely
to succeed, or will be too dangerous.257 In an important change to
United States law, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the list of
predicate offenses for content wiretaps. It added crimes of terrorism;
production or dissemination of chemical weapons; and felony
violations of the law related to computer fraud and abuse to the list of
predicate offenses. 258  An emergency exception also exists in the
United States to the requirement that a judge issue the surveillance
order.259 Finally, roving wiretaps are permitted in the United States in
cases where "specification of the facilities from which.., the
communication is to be intercepted" proves to be "not practical. ' '21'
In both Germany and the United States, applications for wiretap
orders are almost never refused by the responsible judge or
magistrate. In Germany, precise figures are not available regarding
refused wiretap orders, but occasional comments appear in the legal
literature in Germany regarding the ineffectual nature of judicial
oversight. 6' In the United States, a refusal of requests for
254. § 100b Nr. 1 StPO.
255. § 100b Nr. 2 StPO.
256. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)(b) & (d) (2000).
257. Id. § 2518(1)(c).
258. The amendments introduced by the USA PATRIOT Act are codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516(1) (Supp. 2000).
259. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7).
260. Id. § 2518(11).
261. For criticism of the judicial oversight, see Edda Wesslau, Gefahrdung des
Datenschutzes durch den Einsatz neuer Medien im Strafprozefl, ZEITSCHRIFT
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surveillance orders is a rare event. According to the account of the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, ("EPIC") out of the over
20,000 surveillance requests made between 1968 and 1996, judges
refused only twenty-eight.262
F. The Nature of Available Remedies
The remedies in Germany and the United States for violations of
surveillance statutes are notably similar. A consideration of legal
reality in both countries finds further similarities in the significant
gaps in the remedies and their relatively modest utilization.
(1) Defining the Category
Remedies are available in the United States and Germany
should statutory rules not be followed by law enforcement authorities
or telecommunication providers. The remedies in both countries
include both damage awards and exclusion of the material collected
by the authorities.
(2) Tests for Obtaining the Different Remedies
In Germany, both exclusion of material (Verwertungsverbot) and
civil damages are available. Yet, exclusion is available only in narrow
circumstances. Thus, one court has called for limiting suppression to
instances where there was a "complete circumvention" (villige
Umgehung) of the relevant statute. 63 Another justification for
suppression of material would be a surveillance "order issued under
conscious infringement of the law."2" As we shall see, the similarity is
great with the limited current reach of the exclusionary rule in the
United States.
German law also permits damages for violations of its
telecommunications surveillance law. The applicable statute makes
STRAFRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFr 681, 683 (2001). A valuable empirical study of judicial
oversight of wiretaps has been carried out by a team at the University of Bielefeld. The
"Backes Study" found only a single judicial refusal for the 307 requests for surveillance
examined in this project. OTTO BACKES ET AL., WIRKSAMKEITSBEDINGUNGEN VON
RiCHTERVORBEHALTEN BEI TELEFONUBERWACHUNGEN 4 (Dec. 2002), at
http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/Universitaet/Aktuelles/pdf/backes-kurzfassung_
telefonueberwachung.pdf (on file at Hastings Law Journal). Prosecutors told the
researchers, moreover, that they could get any order so long as they sent their request to
the judge along with a draft of a judicial order. Id. Finally, the study found that only a
quarter of the judicial orders met the full statutory requirements. Id. at 3-4.
262. EPIC, TITLE IlI WIRETAP ORDERS DENIED 1968-1996, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/taps-denied.html.
263. BGH 31, 304 (1985) (concerning § 100a StGB) . For a case excluding the results of
a secretly placed "bug" inside a living area, see BGHSt 42, 372 (377) (1997).
264. Id.; BGH 32, 68. For cases drawing further limits on the suppression remedy, see
BGH 42, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIF, 961 (1999); BGHSt 35, 32 (34) (1987).
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reference to the 6eneral remedies found in the Federal Data
Protection Statute. 6 These remedies include criminal penalties,
including up to a year in prison, and money damages for unauthorized
storage, alteration or transfer of protected personal data.
266
One final German institution regarding remedies should be
mentioned. The Federal Data Protection Commissioner has
authority to investigate violation of telecommunications privacy law
in connection with commercial telecommunication services.267 This
power gives the Commissioner, the head of an independent federal
privacy agency, the ability to carry out preventative, "data protection
audits.
,2 68
In the United States, the remedies scheme for law enforcement
violations of telecommunications surveillance statutes is highly
complex. Regarding surveillance of the Internet, Orin Kerr
concludes that the applicable law of remedies "remains unusually
obscure, and the rare judicial decisions construing the statutes tend to
confuse the issues, not clarify them." '269 In particular, the division
between suppression remedies and civil damages can be difficult to
follow. At the risk of possible oversimplification, here is a path
through this aspect of telecommunication privacy law in three easy
steps.
First, an aggrieved party's ability to have material excluded-
that is, suppressed-from use in court cases is legally limited to the
content of conversations. Further, suppression is available only when
the content is captured in transmission.7  Money damages are also
available for such illegal interceptions. 271  A complete defense to
actions brought either for exclusion or for civil damages is supplied by
a "good faith" test, following the United States Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Leon.272  Similar to German law,
considerable restrictions exist on the ability to exclude from use in
273court any material garnered through illegal surveillance.
265. TKG TREATISE, supra note 157, at 1464.
266. §§ 43-44 BDSG.
267. § 91 Nr. 4 TKG. For a discussion of this authority, see TKG TREATISE, supra note
157, at 1465.
268. Id.
269. Kerr, supra note 101, at 807.
270. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (2000).
271. Id. § 2520 (Supp. 2002).
272. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
273. Following Leon, the "good faith" test is expressed in statutory language at 18
U.S.C. § 2520(d). One part of it permits a complete defense based on law enforcement's
"good faith" belief that an authorized party had consented to the surveillance. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2520(d)(3). Another such defense is provided by law enforcement's "good faith"
reliance on "a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization,
or a statutory authorization." 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d)(1).
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Second, an aggrieved party in the United States can obtain
monetary damages for illegal surveillance of stored communications.
A court assesses "the sum of the actual damages suffered by the
plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the
violation, but in no case shall a person entitled to recover receive less
than the sum of $1,000. "274 Courts are also permitted to assess
punitive damages for violations that are "willful or intentional." '275
And criminal remedies, mostly misdemeanor crimes, are also present
for illegal access to stored communications.
Third, and finally, violation of the requirements regarding use of
pen registers is a misdemeanor crime."' The statute permits
imprisonment for not more than one year, a fine, or both.277 It is not
clear, however, whether a civil remedy is present for violations of the
Pen Register Statute. As Kerr notes, "[w]hether the Pen Register
statute could support a private right of action is unclear; apparently
no such suit has ever been brought." '278
V. The Limits of Law and Possible "X" Factors
This Article has traced complex patterns of similarities and
differences in United States and German telecommunications
surveillance law. In this final section, I wish to go beyond
telecommunications law and consider additional areas of law that
may affect activity in this area. This section considers three "X"
factors that may shape the larger legal context of telecommunications
surveillance in the two countries.
At this moment, we return to James Whitman's insightful
exploration of German "civility" law. After an examination of case
law, statutes, and historical sources, Whitman finally attributes the
differences in the two legal cultures regarding civility to a "leveling
up" in Germany and a "leveling down" in the United States. " In
particular, he finds that the German law of civility has its roots in
conflict between aristocracy and the State. In brief, the German State
first used law to displace dueling conflicts into courts, and then over a
century or more, "leveled up" so that all Germans, and not just
aristocrats, could seek recourse to harms to their honor.28  No
equivalent process took place in the United States; rather, according
to Whitman, a "culture of disrespect" exists in the United States in
274. Id. § 2707(c) (2000).
275. Id.
276. Id. § 3121(d) (2000).
277. Id.
278. Kerr, supra note 101, at 818.
279. Whitman, supra note 3, at 1290.
280. Id. at 1300-20.
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which egalitarianism is demonstrated by all people being obliged to
accept rough and ready manners.28 '
Whitman's scholarship leads one to wonder whether a similar or
parallel explanation might be possible for differences in German and
American practices regarding telecommunications privacy. Has there
been a "Whitman Effect," i.e., a "leveling up," for
telecommunications privacy in Germany and a "leveling down" in the
United States? The short answer appears to be that one cannot say
"yes" or "no." A highly significant problem, as I noted at the start of
this Article, is that it is impossible at present to draw any empirical
conclusions about the relative amounts of telecommunications
surveillance. Moreover, the respective laws have numerous
similarities and, in the absence of empirical data, it is difficult
ultimately to say whether the final effect of the German and U.S.
legal regulations leaves practices in the two countries more similar or
dissimilar.
Although one can not identify a "Whitman Effect" in comparing
the telecommunications privacy law of Germany and the United
States, it is possible to broaden the immediate field of scrutiny and
consider, if only briefly, three additional areas that may have an
impact in the two countries. Earlier in this Article, I suggested that
Whitman's own findings regarding the law of civility may in some
measure reflect not only law and history, but also differences in
population density in the Germany and the United States.282 What
are possible "X" factors that affect telecommunications surveillance
in Germany and United States?
Three additional areas that may affect surveillance activity in
different ways are:
1. The United States views information privacy as more of an
individual right; Germany as more of a group right.
2. The United States has "privatized" its telecommunications
surveillance by encouraging providers to "voluntarily" surrender
information.
3. Law enforcement officials in Germany face greater restrictions
on arresting people than U.S. officials do. Thus, a source of
pressure to engage in telecommunications surveillance order
exists in Germany that does not occur in the United States.
I will now briefly assess each of these areas.
A. Privacy as an Individual Right/Privacy as a Group Right
In German constitutional law, as this Article has explored, the
Constitutional Court views telecommunications privacy not as a mere
281. Id. at 1343.
282. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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individual right of privacy, but rather as an interest based in needs for
societal communication and public participation. These concerns not
only make information privacy a key concern for a democratic order,
but also lead to limits on privacy. As the German court noted in its
"Census" decision, information relating to a person depicts "an image
of social reality that the concerned party cannot exclusively
coordinate.'283
In America, in contrast, the right of information privacy has
often been seen as an individual right of control.2" This aspect of
privacy has led to a chorus of academic criticism."' As Priscilla Regan
wrote in 1995, for example, "[m]ost privacy scholars emphasize that
the individual is better off if privacy exists; I argue that society is
better off as well when privacy exists."' 86 My own voice has been
raised in this chorus. I have proposed that information privacy be
seen as protecting both deliberative autonomy and deliberative
democracy.287 The latter interest points to a notion of privacy as a
socially-based right. As I have written, "the law must structure the
use of personal information so that individuals will be free from state
or community intimidation that would destroy their involvement in
the democratic life of the community."2"
283. BVerfGE, 65 (1983), 1 (44).
284. For a discussion of scholars and caselaw that adopt the perspective that I
elsewhere have termed, "privacy-control," see Schwartz, Privacy and the State, supra note
11, at 820-21.
285. See COLIN J. BENNET & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY:
POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 26 (forthcoming 2003) (noting that
"promotion of privacy can itself be socially important"). This important comparative
work, by political scientists working in Canada and Scotland, identifies and faults the
individualistic strand in Anglo-American privacy jurisprudence. Id. at 20-27.
286. PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 221 (1995).
287. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 554, 560-61 (1995). For a
different attempt to develop a similar American right, see Edward J. Eberle, The Right to
Information Self-Determination, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 965.
288. Schwartz, Privacy and the State, supra note 11, at 561. In a later article, I called for
information privacy rules to shape "the terms and conditions under which others have
access to our personal data" to allow cyberspace to be "a place where we develop our
commonality through democratic discourse." Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra
note 11, at 1652. In related work, Mary Coombs considered the idea of "shared privacy"
in the context of the Fourth Amendment. Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (1987). Her focus,
however, is on third-party consent cases rather than telecommunications privacy. For
other works by U.S. privacy scholars who have discussed a group-based right of privacy,
see Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002); Daniel
Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Information Privacy and
the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's
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Comparative telecommunications privacy might, therefore,
present an important area for American professors skeptical of an
individual right of privacy-control. Through a "Whitman Effect," the
German group-based right might be said to have led to a "leveling
up" of privacy. Or, to express this idea differently, everyone's shared
privacy right might be more difficult to diminish than an individually-
based right. As in Aesop's Fable of the Sticks, where the bundled
sticks could not be broken, there may be strength in numbers .2 ' And,
indeed, beyond telecommunications privacy, the German concept of
privacy appears to have led to a higher level of privacy than in the
United States in certain areas of data collection and processing.
Sectors in which the level of privacy in Germany is generally held to
be higher than in the United States include health care and
employment.290 Yet, again, we simply do not know if significant
differences exist in comparative rates of telecommunications
surveillance in Germany and the United States.
B. "Privatization" of Telecommunications Surveillance
As a second influence in this area, it might be that law
enforcement officials are encouraging non-state actors to carry out
surveillance. Both the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 and the more
recent Homeland Security Act in 2002 took modest steps to
Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Information
Practices, 2000 WISC. L. REV. 743 (2000).
289. THE BUNDLE OF STICKS, AESOP FABLES, in 17 HARVARD CLASSICS (1909-14
ed.), at http://www.bartleby.com!17/l/72.html.
290. Regarding health data in Germany, see PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, EUROPEAN DATA
PROTECTION AND MEDICAL PRIVACY IN GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY
AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 329 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997). On
the low level of health privacy protection in the United States, in particular in the
aftermath of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA")
privacy standard, see Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Modern Studies in
Privacy Law: National Health Information Privacy Regulations Under HIPAA: Personal
Privacy and Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health
Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1478-79 (2002). Regarding
employment data in the United States, see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 11, at
349-77. Although employment data in Germany are subject to generally high standards,
the application of telecommunications privacy to an employee's e-mail and phone
conversations is subject to some controversy at present. Experts in Germany do agree
that the principle of telecommunications secrecy should apply to non-business related
telecommunications generated in the employment context. The controversy concerns how
the idea of telecommunications secrecy applies to business communications. Johann
Bizer, Die dienstliche Telekommunikation unter dem Schutz des Fernmeldegeheimnisse, 25
DATENSCHUTZ UND DATENSICHERHEIT 618-19 (2001).
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encourage telecommunication providers and ISPs to voluntarily turn
over customer information to law enforcement. 9'
In current U.S. law, two possibilities exist for such voluntary
disclosure of telecommunications information to a law enforcement
agency. First, the service provider may disclose content that it has
inadvertently received and that "appear[s] to pertain to the
commission of a crime." '292 Second, the service provider may disclose
to law enforcement if it "in good faith believes that an emergency
involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person
requires disclosure without delay of communications relating to the
emergency."'2 93 These two statutory exceptions are, on their face at
least, highly limited. As a result, claims of privatization of
telecommunications surveillance in the United States would be
overstated at present. The legal exceptions certainly do not seem
tantamount to a privatization of surveillance.
Yet, this picture may be changing. A New York Times article in
late 2002 found that forty-one percent of corporate security officers in
the United States were willing to supply customer information to law
enforcement officials and government agencies without a court
order.294 The practices of telecommunications service providers and
other companies with regard to telecommunication attributes may
soon look quite different than the requirements of the law on the
books. Moreover, it is difficult to identify a similar trend in Germany
at this date. Nonetheless, the American attitudes present in the New
York Times poll are of too recent vintage to have yet significantly
shaped U.S. surveillance practices.
C. Police Practices Concerning Arrests
I have saved the strongest possible additional influence on
surveillance activities for last. It concerns one aspect of the
comparative culture of law enforcement authorities in each country.
A common theme in my conversations with governmental officials in
Germany has been the claimed comparative reluctance of law
enforcement officials there to arrest people due to legal restrictions
that reflect a strong societal desire to avoid false arrests. Compared
to the United States, German prosecutors are said to be obliged to
build a case slowly in order to justify arresting a suspect, and, as a
291. Of particular interest in this context is the Homeland Security Act, which includes
language to insulate from liability telecommunication companies that surrender a wide
range of customer information. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b)(6) (2003).
292. Id. § 2702(b)(7)(A)(ii).
293. Id. § 2702(b)(8)(C).
294. John Schwartz, Threats and Responses: Some Companies Will Release Customer
Records on Request, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,2002, at A16.
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consequence, to have a motivation to seek wiretaps that is absent in
the United States.
One difficulty in trying to isolate this influence as a comparative
matter is that law enforcement officials in the United States do not
merely arrest a higher relative percentage of the U.S. population
compared to other countries, but also convict and incarcerate more
individuals than any other country in the world.9 Put differently, the
higher rate of incarceration in the United States is likely to also
reflect a comparatively greater readiness to arrest people. Indeed,
one might logically anticipate that in the United States the officials
who are so eager to arrest will also be ready to engage in wiretapping
so that suspects can be convicted. Moreover, in both the United
States and Germany, strong regional variations exist regarding the
relative amount of surveillance orders within the country.296 This
distinction points to the likely presence, as has been noted, of local
law enforcement norms as an influence on the decision to ask for a
surveillance order.
With these caveats having been expressed, the German law
regarding arrest does appear to set higher requirements than similar
U.S. law. Regarding Germany, its Federal Criminal Procedure
Code's section 112(1) permits detention pending trial
(Untersuchungshaft) only in cases of a party who is "strongly
suspected" (dringend verdichtig) of committing a crime.297 Moreover,
an arrest is forbidden when it would be "out of proportion to the
significance of the circumstance and to the expected punishment."298
This test, as well as the further ones at Criminal Code section 112(2)
and section 112a, appear stricter than the comparable American
standards.2 9  The comparable U.S. standard is a requirement of
"probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person
to be arrested committed it. ' '3°°
Thus, German telecommunications surveillance may be driven
by a reluctance to arrest in a way that is not present in U.S. law. Here
is a possible German trade-off: law enforcement officials are more
likely to wiretap than arrest because the violation of one's liberty
295. Comparative information can be found at the International Centre for Prison
Studies, King's College, at http://www.kcla.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps/worldbrief/north-
americarecords.php?code=4.
296. See supra text accompanying note 35.
297. § 112(a) StPO. For an overview, see Pfeiffer, supra note 41, at 278-82.
298. Id.
299. § 112 Nr. 2 StPO; § 112a StPO. For an overview, see Pfeiffer, supra note 41, at
278-82, 283-85.
300. WAYNE LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 146 (3d ed.
2000). For Supreme Court cases finding arrests to have been made "at large" or otherwise
without probable cause, see Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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involved in an unjustified telecommunications wiretap is less than in a
false arrest. At times, however, this carefulness may mean that some
criminals are not only left free from arrest, but will evade justice-
perhaps by fleeing the F.R.G.0' German law enforcement did arrest
a terrorist involved in the 9-11 conspiracy, however, and a German
court convicted him on February 19, 2003.302 We are again left to
wonder, in Whitman's term, about the "clay" of different places.
A final observation is also possible regarding the comparative
constitutional standards for telecommunications surveillance. In a
dyspeptic reading of U.S. constitutional law, Michael Klarman views
the Supreme Court as, having at best (or perhaps at worst?),
"imposed culturally elite values in marginally countermajoritarian
fashion.""' Yet, the Supreme Court has not taken even such limited
action regarding telecommunications attributes; it has resolutely
taken itself out of involvement in this area. As a result, the
comparative U.S.-German landscape regarding telecommunications
surveillance may one day look quite different than the portrait that
this Article has drawn. It will depend on the merits of the statutes
that the two countries enact or do not enact in the next years.
Conclusion
A U.S. Secretary of State during the 1920s, Henry Stimson,
dissolved a small codebreaking unit in the government with these
words, "[g]entlemen do not read each other's mail. '3 °4 Those days are
gone. In Germany and the United States today, surveillance is an
accepted part of the behavior of law enforcement officials with an
ongoing increase in the grounds under which telecommunications
surveillance, in particular, is justified.
This Article began by exploring difficulties in reaching any
judgment about the relative amounts of telecommunications
surveillance in Germany and the United States. Due to differences in
the way that the respective national statistics are maintained, which in
turn reflect underlying distinctions within the legal regimes, the
available data measure different phenomenon. In response, this
Article has made a modest proposal that the collection of U.S.
wiretap statistics be expanded to include the number of connections
301. See Desmond Butler, Terror Suspect's Departure From Germany Raises Concern in
Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at A14 (German prosecutors note insufficient
evidence to prevent suspect in Djerba bombing from leaving Germany for Saudi Arabia.),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/24/international/europe/24BERL.html.
302. Peter Finn, Moroccan Convicted in Sept. 11 Attacks, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2003, at
Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32352-200Febl9.html.
303. Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
145, 146 (1998).
304. DANIEL KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS 360 (1967).
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subject to surveillance. It has also proposed that all states should be
required to file an annual report with the responsible federal official
regardless of whether surveillance activity has taken place. Such
filing of reports would resolve any doubts about incomplete U.S.
surveillance statistics. Yet, even though an empirical basis is absent
at present for comparisons, one can still examine and evaluate legal
aspects of the respective German and U.S. legal regulations for
telecommunication surveillance.
At the constitutional level, this Article found that the U.S.
Supreme Court has developed a restrictive vision of the Fourth
Amendment that has generally meant that telecommunications
attributes are not protected by the U.S. Constitution. In Germany, in
contrast, Article 10 of the Basic Law contains protections for
communications privacy that the Federal Constitutional Court has
explicitly extended to telecommunications attributes.
My chief findings regarding statutory law are as follows:
statutory law in Germany provides somewhat more flexibility for law
enforcement agencies to obtain connection data than content, but the
former kind of telecommunication attributes still receive relatively
higher legal safeguards in Germany than in the United States.
Moreover, stored data, an important concept in U.S. law, is not a
jurisprudential category in German telecommunications privacy law.
Finally, U.S. law requires neither retention nor erasure of
telecommunications data. In contrast, current German law generally
requires telecommunications connection data to be erased after no
longer than six months. Like the United States, German law has no
requirement for mandatory data retention, but this area is one of
current controversy there and elsewhere in Europe.
In this Article's final section, I analyzed three additional areas of
influence upon the comparative regimes of telecommunications
surveillance in Germany and the United States. Perhaps the most
intriguing of these are the contrasting legal regulations regarding the
arrest of suspects. In Germany, law enforcement officials face
considerable limits on their ability to arrest and, as a result, may have
relatively greater pressure to use telecommunications surveillance. A
strong influence on German telecommunications surveillance may be
the desire to avoid violations of civil liberties through false arrests.
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